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INTRODUCTION 
In 1991, Congress changed the mechanism by which the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) was funded. The result 
was that the Agency, whose principal task is to determine whether an 
invention merits the reward of a patent, became almost entirely 
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funded through user fees.1 Since 1991, the PTO’s budget has largely 
been derived from patent examination and post-allowance fees.2 While 
patent processing comprises the majority of the Agency’s operational 
expenses, patent examination fees cover less than one-third of the 
examination costs.3 As a result, the Agency is heavily dependent on 
post-allowance fees—fees the PTO only collects when it grants a 
patent—to fund its operations. This congressionally set fee structure 
creates a possible financial incentive for the PTO to grant patents, 
although the extent to which the Agency will act on this incentive 
depends both on the PTO’s objectives and its needs. Thus, the 1991 
variation in the law affords the opportunity to explore an important 
issue in administrative law—the relationship between agency funding 
and agency decisionmaking—and an important issue in patent law—
whether the PTO is biased toward issuing patents. 
To the best of our knowledge, this Article undertakes the first 
attempt to causally investigate the influence of the PTO’s funding on 
the Agency’s decisionmaking (i.e., causal in the sense of statistically 
ruling out other potentially confounding factors).4 Through this causal 
investigation, it also builds upon those studies that have attempted—
albeit, more indirectly than the present study—to challenge the 
hypothesis that the PTO’s granting decisions are solely guided by the 
nonbiased application of patentability standards.5 To this extent, we 
 
 1.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 
1388.  
 2.  See, e.g., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2010, at 55 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2010/USPTOFY2010PAR.pdf 
(stating that approximately 85% of total patent income comes from maintenance fees; fees for 
initial application filing, search, and examination; and issue fees). 
 3.  See id. at 55, 57 (showing that although filing, search, and examination fees amount to 
only 28.7% of patent revenue, the “USPTO directs maximum resources to the priority functions 
of patent and trademark examination”). 
 4.  One study by Deepak Hegde has theorized that the PTO’s appropriation process (but 
not the fee schedule) affects patent backlog and patent pendency. However, unlike our analysis, 
Hegde’s analysis, which relies upon graphical time series evidence, was not designed to 
statistically identify (i.e., isolate) the actual relationship between the Agency’s funding and 
outcome of interest. Moreover, Hegde did not explore how the PTO’s fee schedule affects patent 
outcomes nor did he explore how the PTO’s appropriation process affects the Agency’s decision to 
grant a patent. Deepak Hegde, Funding and Performance at the US Patent and Trademark 
Office, 30 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 148 (2012).   
 5.  A number of scholars have set forth evidence that indirectly (noncausally) bears on the 
question of whether the U.S. PTO is biased in its decisionmaking. For instance, scholars have 
compared the growth of patent families—patents that are directed to the same underlying 
inventions that are filed in multiple countries—that originated in the United States with 
successful applications in the United States by U.S. inventors and found the latter to have grown 
over twice as much as the former. They have reasoned that this difference supports declining 
 
2b. FrakesWasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2013  11:57 AM 
70 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1:67 
set forth a theoretical model that predicts that, under certain Agency 
objectives, particular elements of the PTO’s fee structure create 
incentives for the PTO to grant additional patents. Using a rich 
database of previously unavailable patent data, we then empirically 
test the predictions of this model by comparing the Agency’s granting 
patterns before and after the period the PTO became fully user-fee 
funded.6 
Our results suggest that the Agency’s fee schedule biases the 
PTO toward granting patents. For instance, with respect to those 
types of patents for which the PTO is likely to profit the most from 
granting, we estimate a relatively stronger sensitivity to the PTO’s 
funding structure. More specifically, our findings suggest the PTO is 
preferentially granting patents on technologies with high renewal 
rates and patents filed by large entities, as the PTO stands to earn the 
most revenue by granting additional patents of these types. 
Furthermore, we also find that these distortions are more likely to 
occur when markers indicative of an underfunded PTO are present. As 
such, a more general implication of this analysis is that the PTO does 
not appear to seek a universal expansion of its budget. Rather, the 
evidence is more consistent with a view that distortions in the PTO’s 
granting patterns are more likely to occur when the Agency is 
financially constrained. 
Our findings have broad implications for both policy and 
theory. Regarding social welfare policy, our results are discouraging, 
as they suggest that the PTO’s financial incentives, and not solely the 
merits of the invention, may in part be driving patentability decisions. 
Standard economic theory predicts that distortions in the PTO’s 
granting behavior may result in substantial harm to society. While 
patents attempt to push society toward an optimal level of innovation 
by providing inventors with a mechanism to recoup their research and 
development expenses, they do so only at a cost—consumers pay 
 
standards of the U.S. PTO, conceivably as a result of internal biases within the PTO. See, e.g., 
ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 136–38, 142–43 (2004). Other 
scholars have put forth indirect evidence of a PTO bias by suggesting that the decisions of a 
certain group of examiners may be driven, in part, by considerations other than patentability 
standards. See generally Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and the 
Patent Office Outcomes, 94 REV. ECON. & STAT. 817 (2012) (finding that more experienced 
examiners cite less prior art and are more likely to grant patents). While these studies provide 
valuable information, they have not been designed to causally identify a PTO bias, as we attempt 
to do in this Article. For instance, the Jaffe and Lerner analysis, while indeed suggestive of a 
number of possible biases, is not designed to statistically identify any particular bias as being 
responsible for the observed decline in patentability standards within the United States. 
 6.  Details on the database are provided in Part III infra. 
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higher prices and have less access to the patented invention.7 A PTO 
that is applying the patentability standards in a patent-protective 
manner is likely to be routinely granting patents on inventions that 
were either already known or represent only a trivial advancement 
over the existing scientific knowledge.8 As a result, a grant-biased 
PTO is likely to systematically issue patents that end up imposing 
significant costs on society without bestowing the commensurate 
benefits of innovation.9 
Our results are also relevant to the ongoing policy debate in 
Congress and elsewhere on how best to fix the “broken” patent 
system.10 Criticism of the patent system has largely coalesced around 
one charge: the PTO permits too many invalid patents to issue, which 
unnecessarily drains consumer welfare.11 Both the Supreme Court’s 
renewed interest in substantive patent law and the enactment of the 
America Invents Act, which represents the first major overhaul of the 
patent system in over sixty years, were driven in part by this 
 
 7.  See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL 
TREATMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 76 (1969) (explaining the need for finding the optimal 
patent length, because the longer a patent lasts, the greater the social cost of that patent due to 
inefficiencies caused by monopoly of information); Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable 
Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863, 867 (2000) (discussing the costs of “patent thickets”); Keith 
Leffler & Christofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-offs in Patent Litigation Settlements: Analysis Gone 
Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 33, 33 (2004) (stating that the “static inefficiency” caused by valuable 
patents causes consumer welfare to suffer due to high prices). 
 8.  Not surprisingly, the patentability standards reflect a careful balance between 
encouraging innovation and drains on consumer welfare. In order for an invention to be patent 
eligible, it must both be new and represent a nontrivial advancement over current scientific 
understanding. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). If an invention was obvious to the person of ordinary skill 
in the art or was already in the public domain, the invention would have likely arisen without 
the patent incentive. In contrast, an invention that represents a significant advancement in the 
art may not have arisen but for the patent inducement.  
 9.  Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 77 (2005). 
 10.  See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, 
THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5.  
 11.  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http:///www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ 
innovationrpt.pdf (discussing how poor quality patents harm innovation); Mark A. Lemley, 
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 n.1 (2001) (citing a litany 
of sources critical of the PTO for issuing invalid patents); Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is 
the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 185 (2008) (noting the widespread 
consensus that the PTO is routinely issuing invalid patents that impose costs upon the public); 
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. 
L. REV. 45, 47 n.5 (2007) (citing a number of sources calling for reform of the patent system 
because the PTO is issuing a large number of undeserving patents); John R. Thomas, Collusion 
and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
305, 320–22 (demarcating the social costs associated with improvidently issued patents). 
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concern.12 Yet our findings suggest this charge is underinclusive, as 
they provide evidence that the PTO is not only likely biased toward 
issuing patents but also that the Agency is likely biased toward 
issuing particular types of patents—those with a high probability of 
being renewed or those that are filed by large entities. Of course, 
eliminating the Agency’s overgranting tendencies requires not only an 
understanding of the extent of its bias but also the mechanisms that 
create pressure on the Agency to issue patents. Unfortunately, up to 
this point, there has been a failure on both counts.13 As a result, recent 
patent reform efforts are unlikely to eliminate the granting pressure 
identified in this Article.14 
From a policy perspective, our results also suggest that 
congressional action intended to promote innovation with respect to 
entrepreneurs and small firms may have the exact opposite effect. 
Largely in recognition that individuals and small entities both 
constitute a significant source of innovative activity and rely more 
heavily on the patent system than larger enterprises, Congress 
provided a 50% reduction in patent fees to these entities.15 Yet we find 
evidence that this reduction in patent fees has the unintended 
consequence of likely biasing the PTO toward granting patents 
associated with large enterprises. Thus, it is possible that the alleged 
benefits small entities obtain by paying reduced patent fees are 
outweighed by the harms they experience in the marketplace because 
the PTO is extending preferential treatment toward large entities. 
On a theoretical level, our modeling of the various ways in 
which the PTO may distort its practices in light of its funding 
structure builds on, and fills various gaps in, a literature that has 
attributed the PTO’s perceived bias toward issuing patents to a 
number of causes.16 To the extent scholars have posited that the PTO’s 
 
 12.  Lemley & Sampat, supra note 11, at 185. 
 13.  See infra notes 16–18 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra Part V. 
 15.  35 U.S.C. § 41(h)(1) (2006).  
 16.  For example, scholars have argued that the PTO is so underfunded and, hence, 
hamstrung from spending sufficient time examining patent applications to reject patents, see, 
e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 5, at 130–33 (describing the PTO’s budgetary woes); Lemley, 
supra note 11, at 1500 (noting that examiners spend on average only eighteen hours reviewing a 
patent application), that the patent examiners compensation system favors allowances, see, e.g., 
THOMAS H. STANTON ET AL., NAT'L ACAD. OF PUBLIC ADMIN., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE: 
TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 102 (2005), available at 
http://www2.aipla.org/Content/ContentGroups/Issues_and_Advocacy/Comments2/Patent_and_Tr
ademark_Office/20055/NAPAFullReport.pdf (paraphrasing one patent examiner’s statement 
saying that the productivity schedule is “highly biased toward early allowances”); Clarisa Long, 
The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 1991 (2009) 
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user-fee income may bias the Agency toward issuing patents, they 
have done so chiefly under the simple premise that funding the PTO 
through fees paid by patent applicants may lead it to make decisions 
that favor applicants (i.e., grant patents) at the expense of the public 
(i.e., apply the patentability standards in a nonbiased fashion).17 One 
of us has previously argued that by ignoring the structure of user fees, 
legal scholarship has overlooked the import that the more fine-
grained, structural components of agency financing may play in 
influencing agency decisionmaking.18 This Article builds on this 
previous work by exploring how various PTO objectives would interact 
 
(“Internal PTO practices create a bias in favor of granting patents.”); Robert P. Merges,  As Many 
as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent 
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 607 (1999) (“Consequently, the only way to earn 
bonus points with confidence is to allow a patent application.”); Thomas, supra note 11, at 324–
25 (discussing the PTO’s employee shortage and employee compensation structure contribute to 
disproportionate amounts of patent allowances), that the asymmetric review of the Agency’s 
decisions bias it toward expanding substantive patent law, Melissa F. Wasserman, The PTO’s 
Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379, 401–
06 (2011), and that the burden of proof is on the examiner to show that a patent should not issue, 
Thomas, supra note 11, at 325 (“Long-established practice places the burden of persuasion and 
initial burden of production upon examiners to generate rejections.”). 
 17.  See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the 
Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 314 (2007) (“[PTO] is 
favorably disposed to patent holders . . . [in part because] the Agency as a whole is funded by 
applicant fees.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 579 n.178 (2009) (“A 
pro-patent bias also arises because the PTO is wholly funded by patent-applicant fees.”); Long, 
supra note 16, at 1994 (“[T]he PTO’s budgetary structure . . . creates the incentive for the PTO to 
favor patentees (who pay fees to the PTO) over nonpatentees (who do not).”); Michael J. Meurer, 
Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 699 (2009) (“The PTO has endorsed 
a ‘customer service’ orientation that stresses the importance of meeting the needs of patent 
applicants. This orientation may be motivated in part by the dependence of the agency on fees to 
fund its operation.”).  
 18.  While at least two scholars have noted the current fee structure may bias the Agency to 
grant patents, they have not begun to explore how the PTO may have a differential bias across 
patent type. Compare Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s 
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2062 (2009) (“[T]he current fee 
structure also sets up an obvious financial incentive for the PTO to grant patents.”), and Long, 
supra note 16, at 1994 (“[T]he PTO’s budgetary structure creates a bias in favor of granting 
patents and encouraging inventors to apply for patents.”), with Wasserman, supra note 16, at 
407–14 (asserting that the PTO’s budgetary structure favors granting patents that are likely to 
earn the most revenue—i.e., patents directed toward technologies with high renewal rates and 
patents issued to large entities). 
 This gap in the literature is all the more puzzling in consideration of the substantial 
literature regarding the incentives created by various fee structures and compensation 
structures in other decisionmaking contexts. To provide one example, scholars in health 
economics, law, and policy have long acknowledged the expansionary distortions in physician 
decisionmaking that may follow from a “fee-for-service” payment system that more generously 
compensates physicians for providing their patients with a greater quantity of medical services, 
such as office visits, procedures, and tests. See, e.g., Thomas G. McGuire, Physician Agency, in 
HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS 461, 517–19 (A.J. Culyer & J.P. Newhouse eds., 2000).  
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with both the Agency’s fee structure and the nuances of the PTO’s 
budgetary process and, of course, empirically testing the hypotheses 
that result from this exploration. 
Despite a general perception in the literature that the PTO is 
routinely granting bad patents,19 it is important that scholars turn to 
an empirical analysis of PTO decisionmaking, as we endeavor to do in 
this Article, in order to understand whether the PTO is, in fact, 
deviating from otherwise optimal practices. After all, there are at least 
three reasons to doubt that the Agency’s funding mechanism would 
bias the PTO toward issuing patents. First, as administrative law 
scholars have long debated, the nature or objectives of high-level 
agency administrators are unclear.20 Do bureaucrats seek larger 
budgets for self-interested reasons or solely to better accomplish the 
Agency’s mission? Second, Congress has never given the PTO the 
authority to spend all of the fees it collects, potentially blunting any 
incentives of the PTO to grant additional patents in an attempt to 
expand its budget.21 Third, emphasizing the autonomous nature of 
individual patent examiners and the difficulties involved in 
supervising examiners,22 the current literature has questioned the 
 
 19.  See sources cited supra note 11. 
 20.  Compare WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 38–42 (1971) (arguing that bureaucrats seek enlarged budgets because they are 
positively correlated with other goods the bureaucrat values such as power, prestige, and salary), 
and THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE (Andre Blais & Stephane 
Dion eds., 1991) (aggregating a number of essays and studies that support the assertion that 
bureaucrats seek enlarged budgets), with JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT 
AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 182 (1989) (“The view that all bureaus want larger budgets 
ignores the fact that there is often a tradeoff between bigger budgets on the one hand and the 
complexity of tasks, the number of rivals, and the multiplicity of constraints on the other.”), 
Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. REV. 915 
(2005) (arguing that empire-building of agencies is overstated because bureaucrats do not have 
the same motives as corporate leaders), and Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 120 (2008) (challenging the notion 
that bureaucrats will always seek to increase budgets).  
 21.  See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.  
 22.  See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Ending the Patenting Monopoly, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1541, 1544, 1551, 1559–60 (2009) (noting the PTO’s difficulties in controlling patent 
examiner’s output); Meurer, supra note 17, at 700 (detailing the difficulties associated with 
implementing reforms affecting patent examiners).  
 Several scholars have found that patent examiner characteristics have an effect on patent 
outcomes. See, e.g., Iain M. Cockburn et al., Are All Patent Examiners Equal? Examiners, Patent 
Characteristics, and Litigation Outcomes, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE BASED ECONOMY 19 
(Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., Nat’l Acads. Press 2003) (finding that differences in 
examiners explain a significant percentage of the variation in the characteristics of issued 
patents, and that some examiners are more likely than others to have their patents upheld in 
court); Lemley & Sampat, supra note 5 (finding that more experienced examiners cite less prior 
art and are more likely to grant patents); Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History 
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ability of the PTO to enact top-down directives, such as pressure to 
grant more patents (especially in targeted areas).23 
Finally, our findings also shed light on some of the above-
mentioned ambiguities surrounding agency responsiveness to 
financial incentives. Our results contradict the idea that bureaucrats 
seek to maximize their budgets for self-interested reasons—i.e., in an 
effort to increase their own salaries, prestige, or advancement. 
Instead, our findings suggest that, to the extent bureaucrats seek 
enlarged budgets, they do so as a result of being mission minded but 
resource constrained. 
The rest of the Article is organized as follows. Part I delineates 
the PTO’s possible financial incentives to grant patents and begins to 
explore the extent to which the PTO will act on this incentive by 
introducing two competing models of agency behavior: the self-
interested PTO and the benevolent PTO. Part II further refines these 
models of agency behavior by examining how the PTO’s financial 
incentives likely vary across patent types. Part II also introduces the 
predictions of these models, which serve as the hypotheses that will 
guide our empirical analysis. Part III describes the data set and 
methodology utilized. The results of our empirical analysis are 
presented in Part IV. Part V begins to explore the implications of our 
results and also assesses potential methods to reduce the PTO’s 
financial tendency toward issuing patents. This Part also concludes 
that the recently enacted America Invents Act, which grants the PTO 
fee-setting authority, is unlikely to extinguish the PTO’s financial 
predisposition to grant patents. 
I.  THE PTO’S FINANCIAL INCENTIVES AND ITS OBJECTIVES 
This section describes how the PTO’s current budgetary 
process, including its fee schedule, sets up possible financial incentives 
to grant patents.24 It next turns to examining when and if the PTO is 
likely to act on those financial incentives by exploring two competing 
models of agency behavior: the self-interested PTO who desires to 
maximize its budget and the benevolent-but-resource-constrained PTO 
 
Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151 (2004) (finding that certain examiners more systematically 
required applicants to narrow the scope of their patents).  
 23.  See, e.g., Abramowicz & Duffy, supra note 22, at 1559–60, 1563–64 (discussing the 
difficulty the PTO has controlling examiner conduct despite strict rules and oversight).  
 24.  We use the term patents in this Article to refer to “utility” patents. A utility patent 
protects the way an article is used and works. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  
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who seeks additional funding in order to match its revenue with its 
expenses. 
A.  The PTO’s Budget Process and Its Possible Financial Incentives to 
Grant Patents 
Historically, the PTO has been funded largely by taxpayer 
revenues. In 1991, the Agency was made to essentially fund its entire 
operations through user fees.25 The PTO, however, was not given fee-
setting authority—Congress chose to remain the sole arbitrator of 
patent fee levels.26 Importantly, Congress also did not give the Agency 
the right to automatically spend its fee collections; instead the PTO 
must receive congressional approval through annual appropriations to 
utilize its fee revenue.27 
Prior to 2004, Congress routinely set the Agency’s budget to a 
level that was essentially below both its estimated and actual fee 
collections.28 Since 2004, the Agency’s spending authority has been 
 
 25.  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 
1388. The PTO’s budget in 1991 was over three hundred and seventy million dollars, of which 
three million were from general revenue funds. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 1991 
ANNUAL REPORT 1–2 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 ANNUAL REPORT].  
 26.  The PTO only recently obtained fee-setting authority. Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10(a), 125 Stat. 284, 316 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 41 (West 
2012)). Prior to 2011, the PTO lacked fee-setting authority and any significant change in the 
filing fees, issuance fees, and maintenance fees required congressional action. See 35 U.S.C. § 
41(d) (2006) (amended 2011) (limiting the PTO’s discretion in setting fees to minor issues such as 
“processing, services, or materials”).  
 27.  The PTO is funded through discretionary spending, which means that Congress 
evaluates the Agency and its funding needs annually during the appropriations cycle. See 
Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 
35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 387, 398–400 (1998) (describing discretionary spending and the budget 
process generally).  
 28.  In 1991, when Congress made the Agency essentially user-fee funded it concomitantly 
enacted a 69% surcharge on certain patent fees. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101(a), 104 Stat. 1388. From the fiscal years of 1991 to 1998, fees 
collected from users were fully available to the PTO; however, surcharge revenue was not. 
Starting in the fiscal year of 1992, Congress limited the Agency’s ability to spend surcharge fees, 
using the fees to fund other government programs. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, 
Pub. L. No. 108-199, div. B, tit. II, 118 Stat. 3.  
 In 1999 the surcharge fees expired. From 1999 to 2003, Congress made a certain dollar 
amount of fees unavailable for PTO use each year and then, in differing amounts over the years, 
allowed the Agency to use some, but not all, of the prior year’s fees. The result, however, was 
that for the fiscal years of 1999 to 2003, the Agency’s budget was essentially set below its 
estimated fee collections. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 54 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2003/2003 
annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 54 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 PERFORMANCE AND 
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capped at its projected revenue stream, which has resulted in the 
PTO’s budget being larger than its fee collections at times.29 When the 
PTO’s fee collections fall below its appropriated budget, the Agency 
will experience a budgetary shortfall, as Congress does not provide the 
Agency with the difference.30 In contrast, if the PTO’s fee collections 
surpass its spending authority, the excess fees are not immediately 
available to the PTO.31 On occasion, the PTO has obtained 
 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2002/1-
58.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2001, at 58 (2001), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2001/ 
01performreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2000, at 49 (2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/ 
stratplan/ar/2000/00findisc.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A PATENT AND TRADEMARK 
OFFICE REVIEW: CENTURY OF AMERICAN INVENTION, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 28 (1999), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/1999/99mssgchief.pdf. For example, in the fiscal year of 
2002 the PTO estimated its fee collections would total $1,346 million. OFFICE OF MGMT. AND 
BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2002, APPENDIX, DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE 227 (2002), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2002-APP/pdf 
/BUDGET-2002-APP-1-6.pdf. That year, Congress chose to set the office’s budgetary resources 
for spending to $1,146.7 million, of which $282.3 million was from fees collected in fiscal years 
2000 and 2001. Congress also appropriated $843.7 million from fees collected during fiscal year 
2002; however, $304.1 million from fees collected during fiscal year 2002 was not available for 
spending. 2002 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra, at 54. 
 29.  U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 60 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2004/2004annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, at 80 
(2005) [hereinafter 2005 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2005/2005annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 83 (2006) 
[hereinafter 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.uspto 
.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2006/2006annualreport.pdf; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 53 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ 
ar/2007/2007annualreport.pdf. 
 30.  This occurred in the fiscal years of 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009. 2005 PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 29, at 80 (PTO was appropriated up to $1.554 million 
but only collected $1.497 million in fees); 2006 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, 
supra note 29, at 83 (PTO was appropriated up to $1.683 million but only collected $1.554 million 
in fees); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2008, at 54 (2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2008/ 
2008annualreport.pdf (PTO was appropriated up to $1.915 million but only collected $1.879 
million in fees); U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 47 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT], available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf (PTO 
was appropriated up to $2.010 million but only collected $1.874 million in fees).  
 31.  This occurred in the fiscal years of 1992–2004, 2007, 2010, and 2011. 2003 
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 47 (stating that PTO fee 
collections exceeded spending authority); 2004 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, 
supra note 29, at 80; 2007 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 29, at 53; 
2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 99; U.S. PATENT & 
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supplemental appropriations from Congress enabling the Agency to 
use all or a portion of these excess fees.32 More typically, the excess 
fees are utilized by Congress to fund other government operations.33 
This practice, known as fee diversion, first occurred in 1992 and 
appears to have peaked in the late 1990s to the early 2000s.34 We 
revisit the nuances of this quasi-appropriations process when 
discussing the incentives posed by the practice of fee diversion in Part 
IV below. To illustrate the incentives posed by the Agency’s fee 
structure, however, we proceed by simply viewing the PTO as 
operating off of the user fees that it collects. 
Since the PTO became essentially fully user-fee funded, 
roughly 85% of its patent operating budget is garnered through three 
types of fees: (1) filing, search, and examination fees (collectively 
referred to as examination fees), (2) issuance fees, and (3) 
maintenance or renewal fees.35 Examination fees are paid at the time 
the application is filed, issuance fees are paid at the time a patent 
 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 67 
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2011/USPTOFY2011PAR.pdf.  
 32.  See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-224, 124 Stat. 2385 (designating a supplemental appropriation in the 
fiscal year of 2010 enabling the PTO to spend an additional $129 million in fee collections, 
bringing the PTO’s spending authority up to $2.016 billion in fee collections). 
 33.  In theory these surplus fees may become available to the Agency in future years—the 
PTO still has these fees on its books as “temporarily unavailable.” See, e.g., 2011 PERFORMANCE 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 67. However, it is widely believed that the PTO 
is unlikely to ever receive the authority to spend these fees, at least not any significant portion of 
them. INTELLECTUAL PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, UNDERSTANDING PATENT FEE DIVERSION AND HOW IT 
IS AFFECTED BY CURRENT SENATE AND HOUSE PATENT REFORM BILLS 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&ContentID=30761&Template=/CM/Conten
tDisplay.cfm (“No one expects that these fees will ever be made available to the USPTO.”). 
 34.  Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, User Fees Diverted from the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) 1991-2005, INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N, http://www.ipo.org/ 
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&section=USPTO_Fees_and_Funding&template=/CM/Content
Display.cfm&ContentFileID=2294 (last modified Dec. 16, 2004). Importantly, the America 
Invents Act does not conclusively end the practice of fee diversion, although it arguably 
diminishes the chances it will occur. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 22, 125 Stat. 284, 336 (2011). The 
America Invents Act creates a new account, known as the “reserve fund,” wherein fees the PTO 
collects above its appropriated budget are deposited, but does not guarantee the PTO access to 
these fees. Id. The language of the Act defers to future appropriations bills as to this matter; 
therefore, it appears to leave open the possibility that fee diversion may occur in the future. See 
id. 
 35.  2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 55 (stating that 
approximately 84% of total patent income comes from maintenance fees, fees related to initial 
application for filing, search, and examination, and issue fees); U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
A PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE REVIEW: WORKING FOR OUR CUSTOMERS, FISCAL YEAR 1994, 
at 59 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 ANNUAL REPORT] (stating that approximately 83% of total patent 
income comes from maintenance fees, filing fees, and issue fees). 
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application is granted, and maintenance fees are paid periodically over 
the lifetime of an issued patent so that the patent can remain 
enforceable. 
While examination fees account for approximately 30% of the 
PTO budget, these fees fail to cover the actual cost incurred by the 
PTO to examine applications.36 Consider, for example, that in the 
fiscal year of 2011 the PTO estimated that the average cost of 
examining a patent application was approximately $3,600.37 Yet, 
during the fiscal year of 2011 the examination fee was set at $1,090 
for large for-profit corporations and half that amount for individuals, 
small firms, nonprofit corporations, or other enterprises that qualify 
for “small entity” status.38 Therefore, the level of examination fees 
covered less than one-third of the actual examination costs for large 
corporations and less than one-sixth of actual costs for small entities. 
The PTO is heavily dependent on issuance fees and 
maintenance fees, which account for over 50% of the PTO’s patent 
budget, to fund its operations.39 These post-allowance fees are 
typically larger than the examination fees. In the fiscal year of 2011, 
the issuance fee was set at $1,510, and the maintenance fees that are 
due at three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years 
from the date the patent issues were $980, $2,480, and $4,110, 
respectively.40 Again, small entities pay half these amounts. The 
result is that the vast majority of the PTO’s budget is gained through 
fees that the Agency collects only if a patent is granted. Further, the 
majority of the Agency’s operational costs are incurred by processing 
patents;41 the expenses associated with issuing and maintaining a 
patent are minimal.42 Thus, these post-allowance fees are almost 
 
 36.  2009 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 30, at 49 (stating 31.3% 
of total patent income comes from filing, search, and examination fees). 
 37.  2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 17 (stating that in 
2011 the average patent cost $3,594 to examine). 
 38.  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(1) (2011) (listing a basic filing fee of $330 and $165 for a small 
entity); 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(k) (listing a utility search fee of $540 and $270 for a small entity); 37 
C.F.R. § 1.16(o) (listing a utility examination fee of $220 and $110 for a small entity). Entities 
defined by the PTO as “small” include individuals, nonprofit corporations, or corporations that 
qualify as small businesses under the Small Business Act. 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(1)–(3).  
 39.  See 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 56 (noting that 
“renewals [fees] recoup costs incurred during the initial patent process”). 
 40.  37 C.F.R. § 1.18(a) (utility fee); §§ 1.20(e)–(g) (maintenance fees).  
 41.  1991 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 3 fig.1 (noting that patent processing 
constituted 51% of the PTO’s total obligations). 
 42.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-97-113, FEES ARE NOT ALWAYS 
COMMENSURATE WITH THE COSTS OF SERVICES 26 (1997) (noting that “only 8.6 percent of the 
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exclusively used to fund other Agency activity. The back-end fee 
structure and the inadequacies of the examination fees both provide a 
possible incentive for the PTO to grant rather than deny patents. The 
extent to which the PTO would act on either of these inducements 
depends, in part, on the objectives of the Agency and its needs. 
B.  The PTO’s Objectives 
The decisions of agencies, like those of many other entities, are 
influenced by a variety of factors. The purpose of this Section is not to 
elucidate every factor that may affect agency decisionmaking but 
instead to establish that under certain situations monetary concerns 
are likely to influence the decisionmaking process of the PTO. To this 
effect, this Section outlines two competing models of agency behavior. 
The first model assumes a self-interested bureaucrat who desires to 
maximize the Agency’s budget. For this bureaucrat, the existence of 
post-allowance fees will bias the PTO toward allowing patents. The 
second model supposes a benevolent bureaucrat that is resource 
constrained. Unlike the self-interested bureaucrat, the benevolent 
bureaucrat’s bias toward granting patents may stem solely from the 
PTO’s examination fees failing to cover the Agency’s examination 
expenses. However, even if examination fees were adequate, a 
benevolent bureaucrat may apply the patentability standards in a 
patent-protective direction if the Agency’s overall fee collections failed 
to cover its operational expenses. 
1.  Self-Interested Bureaucrat 
To begin, we envision a state of the world in which the PTO 
resembles the imperialistic maximizing bureaucrat theorized by 
William Niskanen.43 Niskanen posits that bureaucrats seek to 
maximize agency budgets because budgets are positively correlated 
with other goods that a bureaucrat values, such as compensation, 
prestige, power, and prospects for advancement.44 In other words, 
Niskanen contemplates a self-interested bureaucrat that puts his own 
 
costs associated with an individual patent were attributable to the actual issue of the patent and 
0.1 percent were attributable to its maintenance”). 
 43.  See generally Andre Blais & Stephane Dion, Introduction to THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING 
BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 3–11; WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., 
BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 38 (1971).  
 44.  Robert A. Young, Budget Size and Bureaucratic Careers, in THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING 
BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 33 (citing NISKANEN, supra note 43, 
at 38). 
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interests above those of the public.45 Under Niskanen’s view, it is the 
existence of informational asymmetries that enables high-level 
administrators to extract ever-increasing budgets from Congress.46 
The universal nature of the maximizing bureaucrat, however, 
has been questioned.47 One line of challenge focuses on the extent to 
which high-level administrators actually profit from enlarged budgets. 
Even if bureaucrats were primarily self-interested there is little 
empirical evidence that high-level administrators accrue larger 
salaries when a bureau’s budget grows.48 Of course, there is still the 
possibility that such administrators seek larger budgets for intangible 
benefits such as power and prestige.49 However, to date, there is little 
empirical evidence that supports or refutes this latter hypothesis.50 
Another line of inquiry has challenged Niskanen’s view that Congress 
is easily duped into providing agencies with inflated budgets.51 By 
delineating the multitude of ways in which the legislature and the 
executive exert considerable influence over administrative agencies, 
scholars have largely refuted Niskanen’s assumption that Congress is 
 
 45.  NISKANEN, supra note 43, at 38. 
 46.  Id. at 36–42. 
 47.  See WILSON, supra note 20, at 182 (“The view that all bureaus want larger budgets 
ignores the fact that there is often a tradeoff between bigger budgets on the one hand and the 
complexity of tasks, the number of rivals, and the multiplicity of constraints on the other.”); 
Levinson, supra note 20, at 916 (arguing that empire-building of agencies is overstated because 
bureaucrats do not have the same motives as corporate leaders). 
 48. See Levinson, supra note 20, at 932 (“[T]he relationship between a larger agency budget 
and higher salaries or cushier working conditions is empirically tenuous”); Young, supra note 44, 
at 37–43 (concluding that studies on the relationship between budget growth and financial 
benefits to bureaucrats “are unanimous in offering little support, even to the weak proposition 
that bureaucrats become relatively better-off when the budget of their bureau grows 
disproportionately”). Research shows that it is seniority, not the size of the Agency budgets, that 
explains a substantial portion of salary increases. Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, Agency 
Growth, Salaries and the Protected Bureaucrat, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 431–51 (1989). 
 49.  Andre Blais & Stephane Dion, Conclusion: Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers?, in 
THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 357. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, 
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. 
REV. 431, 443 (1989) (describing the appropriations process as a “low cost route” politicians use 
to prevent agency deviations from congressional goals); Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas 
Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlook: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 165, 170 (1984) (noting that “subcommittees controlling authorizations and appropriations 
may be in a better position to do oversight than so-called oversight committees”); cf. Barry R. 
Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory 
Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 789 (1983) (finding 
congressional preferences over agency action to be a statistically significant factor). 
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submissive in setting agencies’ budgets.52 Of course, Niskanen’s views 
may continue to hold some relevance in that it remains possible, even 
likely, that both Congress and bureaucrats play influential roles in the 
budgetary process.53 Accordingly, we consider the manner in which a 
self-interested PTO of the Niskanen variety would seek to expand its 
budget. 
While the PTO’s budgetary process provides the Agency with 
multiple pathways to satisfy its maximizing proclivities,54 arguably 
the easiest way for the Agency to increase its budget is to grant more 
patents. In this scenario, the PTO exploits its informational monopoly 
on the socially optimal grant rate to artificially inflate its fee 
collections (and hence the budget that it requests reflecting those 
inflated fee collections). At the extreme, a self-interested PTO would 
grant every patent, as the existence of back-end fees means the 
Agency can maximize its fee collections by maximizing its patent 
grants (this is true whether or not the Agency’s examination fees 
covered the full operational expenses of the PTO). However, there are 
a number of reasons why the Agency would not adopt such an 
excessive practice, including the fact that Congress is unlikely to 
believe that a 100% grant rate is optimal. Nonetheless, a self-
interested PTO can still increase its budget by biasing the Agency 
toward granting patents, as long as its distortionary bias remains 
under the threshold of congressional detection. 
 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  There is empirical evidence that suggests bureaucrats have a substantial impact on 
budgetary outcomes and that this impact usually results in larger budgets. Jean-Michel 
Cousineau & Anne-Marie Girard, Public Sector Unions, Government Expenditures, and the 
Bureaucratic Model, in THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND EVIDENCE, supra 
note 20, at 259 (finding that the presence of a public sector union in a municipality tends to 
increase government expenditures by about six percent).  
 54.  Of course, the PTO could seek to increase its budget by lobbying Congress for fee 
increases. In this scenario, the PTO could leverage its informational monopoly on the true cost of 
examining patent applications to extract temporary or long-term fee increases from Congress. 
Because the Agency’s budget is generally set to its estimated fee collections, any increase in fee 
levels will automatically translate into a larger budget. Niskanen’s model predicts that the PTO 
would repeatedly and routinely ask for needless fee increases. The Agency has enjoyed some 
success in lobbying for larger fees, but its success has been far from universal. See infra note 57.  
 The Agency could also lobby for enhanced fee-setting authority. To the extent that the PTO 
could control its fee levels, the PTO could increase its fees in an effort to enlarge its own budget. 
Arguably, biasing the Agency toward granting patents is the easiest pathway to increase the 
PTO’s budget, as this requires the least congressional action.  
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2.  Benevolent-but-Resource-Constrained Bureaucrat 
The PTO bureaucrat, however, does not need to be self-
interested in order to seek a larger budget. High-level administrators 
may also seek more abundant budgets because of their values; there is 
ample evidence that many civil servants are mission minded.55 The 
“benevolent bureaucrat” is a high-level administrator who attempts to 
increase agency funding solely for the purpose of allowing the agency 
to better accomplish its mission. 
While the benevolent PTO’s preferred method of augmenting 
the Agency’s budget is to lobby Congress for increased fee levels,56 this 
approach is unlikely to yield routine success.57 Thus, in certain 
situations even an administrator that is only attempting to better 
accomplish the PTO’s mission may bias the Agency toward issuing 
patents in an effort to augment the Agency’s budget. 
Congress has stipulated that the PTO funds its entire 
operations through fee revenue.58 Yet, at the same time, Congress set 
the Agency’s fee structure so that examination fees fail to cover two-
thirds of the Agency’s costs to examine patent applications. The 
inadequacy of the examination fees necessitates the Agency’s 
dependence on post-allowance fees to subsidize the examination 
process. More generally, the fact that half of the Agency’s budget 
 
 55.  See KENNETH A. SHEPSLE & MARK S. BONCHEK, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, 
BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 347–48 (1997); Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., The Budget-Maximizing 
Bureaucrat: Is There a Case?, in THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND 
EVIDENCE, supra note 20, at 66 (discussing case studies that indicate many civil servants are 
mission minded).  
 56.  This course of action would allow the PTO to increase its budget without distorting its 
own granting behavior.  
 57.  While there is general agreement that the PTO’s present budget is insufficient for the 
Agency to carry out its expected responsibilities, FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: 
THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 10 (2003) (“Hearings 
participants unanimously held the view that the PTO does not receive sufficient funding for its 
responsibilities.”), Congress has on a number of occasions refused to increase fee levels. Fee 
changes appear to be harder to enact when they are not supported by patent applicants. For 
example, a 1990 and 1991 campaign to end small-entity status and a 2002 campaign to increase 
fee levels and restructure fees were largely unsuccessful because patent applicants did not 
support these increases. See Traci Watson, Patent Office Drops Plan to Raise Fees, 356 NATURE 
645, 645 (1992) (noting that after “failing twice to convince Congress that small-scale inventors 
do not deserve a price break, the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has dropped its 
opposition to such a discount” and that “small inventors convinced Congress that a higher 
maintenance fees [sic] would weaken the US economy”). 
 58.  It was congressional intent that the fees the Agency collects cover the full operating 
needs of the Agency. See WENDY H. SCHACHT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20906, U.S. PATENT 
AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS: A BRIEF EXPLANATION 1 (2011) (reviewing 
the Patent and Trademark Office’s funding as a result of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act).  
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stems from these back-end fees suggests the PTO is heavily dependent 
on these fees to cover its operational expenses. Accordingly, the PTO 
must grant patents at a sufficiently high rate to recoup these costs. 
It is of course possible that the Agency’s nonbiased grant rate—
i.e., the rate at which it would grant patents if it were solely applying 
the patentability standards in a nonbiased fashion—is at a rate such 
that the PTO would indeed be able to cover its operational costs. In 
this instance, a benevolent PTO would not be bound by any resource 
constraints and would thus feel no need to distort its granting 
practices in an effort to generate additional fees. However, if this 
otherwise nonbiased grant rate is such that its current stream of fee 
collections based on these granting patterns is insufficient to cover the 
Agency’s operational expenses—i.e., the Agency’s grant rate is below a 
sustainability threshold rate—then the Agency will need to raise 
additional revenues in order to achieve financial sustainability. In this 
instance, the PTO may find itself inclined to increase its granting 
tendencies in order to cover this shortfall. 
A number of time-varying factors may disrupt the equilibrium 
reached between the Agency’s back-end fees and front-end and other 
operational costs and thus induce a bias toward granting. The PTO is 
more likely to trigger its sustainability constraint and encounter an 
imbalance between its back-end fees and examination or other 
operational costs under two broad scenarios: (1) when its nonbiased 
grant rate drops below the threshold rate required to break even, 
taking as given all of those factors that shape the break-even 
threshold (discussed below) or (2) when that threshold rate itself rises, 
taking as given the PTO’s nonbiased rate of granting. This first 
scenario may arise if the quality of the stream of incoming patents 
deteriorates, leaving the PTO otherwise inclined to grant less 
frequently. The second scenario (i.e., an increase in the threshold 
sustainability rate) may materialize upon the occurrence, among 
others, of the following developments: (1) patentees elect to pay their 
maintenance fees at a lower rate, (2) aggregate examination costs rise 
due to a shift in patent applications toward more complex technology 
classes (to which the PTO allocates more examination hours), (3) the 
aggregate incidence of small-entity applicants rises, and (4) patent 
examinations demanded of the PTO increase (relative to the existing 
stock of patents from which the PTO may collect post-allowance 
fees).59 In each such instance, the indicated development will decrease 
 
 59.  The PTO is dependent on renewal fees from patents that were issued three-and-a-half, 
seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years ago to sustain its processing of patent applications 
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the ratio between the back-end fees to be collected by the PTO and the 
obligatory operational costs of the PTO and thus, all else equal, 
increase the rate at which the Agency must grant patents so that its 
fees will be able to cover the Agency’s expenses. 
In the event that any of the above developments do indeed 
challenge the ability of the Agency to finance its operational costs 
through the fees generated by its nonbiased patent grants, the 
benevolent PTO may find that it is left with no other choice than to 
increase its grant rate in order to break even.60 
II.  THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT OF THE AGENCY’S FINANCIAL 
INCENTIVES 
The previous Part established that the PTO can increase its fee 
collections and hence likely its budget by granting additional patents, 
and, in order to better understand when high-level administrators 
would bias the PTO toward granting patents, introduced two different 
models of agency behavior: the self-interested bureaucrat who desires 
to maximize the Agency’s budget and a resource-constrained, 
benevolent bureaucrat who desires to generate additional funds in 
order to maintain financial sustainability. This Part further refines 
these models by considering an additional nuance in Agency 
decisionmaking: the PTO’s monetary incentives likely vary across 
patent types. Although the Agency’s basic fee structure preferences 
patent grants over denials, not all patents grants generate equal 
revenue.61 As a result, the PTO may find that it will best achieve the 
goals of self-interest or benevolence by granting more patents of 
certain types relative to others. This Article examines two 
 
today. However, the PTO is processing many more applications today than it was even four, 
eight, or twelve years ago. As the ratio of the PTO’s fee levels has not dramatically changed over 
time, it is unlikely that the fee levels were set to allow for such a dramatic growth in the volume 
of processed patent applications. Thus, the PTO’s financial sustainability may be threatened 
solely by the fact that the Agency, which is under continued pressure to expand its capacity to 
examine patent applications in order to decrease its growing backlog, must fund its expansion in 
processing capacity based on previously issued patents. 
 60.  David S. Kim & Glenn M. Kubota, Behind the Scenes at the USPTO: Accounting for the 
Supervisory Patent Examiner, MORRISON & FOERSTER Q. NEWS, Summer 2011, at 2, 3 (“One 
former examiner recalled that allowances were being encouraged at the same time that USPTO 
fee revenues were reported as being low.”). In an effort to reestablish financial equilibrium, the 
PTO could attempt to cut costs, such as enacting a hiring freeze. However, any such efforts 
would only leave the PTO less able to process the substantial (and likely growing) number of 
examinations demanded of the Agency to which the Agency is obligated to respond.  
 61.  See Wasserman, supra note 16, at 412–14 & n.129 (noting that the PTO stands to earn 
more money by granting patents in technologies with high renewal rates and patents associated 
with large entities). 
2b. FrakesWasserman_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2013  11:57 AM 
86 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:1:67 
characteristics that bear on the PTO’s ability to earn increased 
revenue by issuing additional patents of certain types: (1) the rate of 
renewal or maintenance among patents of certain types and (2) the 
entity size (large vs. small) of the relevant patent applicant.62 
The latter characteristic, entity size, is immediately discernible 
to the PTO upon the filing of a patent application. Patent examiners, 
who are charged with reviewing applications and making a decision on 
the patentability of the invention, know the entity size of the patent 
applicant.63 Because small entities pay half the examination, issue, 
and maintenance fees of large entities, entity size has a significant 
impact on the magnitude of the Agency’s fee stream. In contrast, 
maintenance rates are not readily apparent to the Agency upon the 
filing of a patent application. However, the PTO may assess the 
likelihood that a given patent will ultimately pay renewal fees by 
using relevant historical data on maintenance rates associated with 
patents within the same technology category of the application. The 
PTO may assign these categorical likelihoods using a relatively coarse 
classification of technology types (e.g., chemical applications, electrical 
device applications, etc.) or, perhaps, using the more fine-grained, 
internal classification system that the PTO uses to instruct its 
examination search process.64 Finally, it should be noted that unlike 
entity size, patent class and technology types do not cause the 
maintenance fees paid by patent applicants to vary. 
While this study is not designed to explore the mechanism by 
which additional patents are granted, we believe there are at least two 
 
 62.  See id. at 412 n.129 (noting that because small entities pay half the amount of issue 
and renewal fees as large entities, the PTO stands to make twice as much fee revenue by 
granting a patent to a large relative to a small entity); id. at 412–14 (noting that because 
patentees in certain technological sectors are more likely to renew their patents than other 
technological sectors, the PTO stands to earn more fee revenue by granting a patent associated 
with a technology that has a high renewal rate relative to a patent associated with a technology 
that has a low renewal rate).  
 63.  This information is included in the patent application documents provided to patent 
examiners. Patent applications are not sorted by large and small entities. Applications for the 
most part are randomly assigned to patent examiners that have the technological expertise to 
examine the application. See Lemley & Sampat, supra note 5, at 818. 
 64.  Every patent application that is filed with the PTO is assigned a classification before it 
enters examination. The Agency utilizes classifications to funnel patent applications to 
examiners with the prerequisite scientific knowledge to review the application. With respect to 
the examination complexity factor, the PTO is well suited to differentiate across patent 
applicants using this fine-grained internal classification system (as opposed to a broader 
technological classification), given that the complexity measures used to allocate examination 
hours (and thus examiner pay) are determined in the first instance with reference to the 
applicant’s patent class.  
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different channels for favoring certain patent types.65 The first is a 
top-down channel, wherein senior-level officials who are responsive to 
the post-allowance fee differential instruct examiners to preferentially 
grant patents filed by large entities and high renewal-rate 
technologies relative to others. The PTO’s ability to extend such 
categorical or technology-specific instructions to examiners is 
facilitated by the Agency’s organizational structure, which is itself 
largely based on technological divisions.66 The second is an examiner-
focused channel, whereby patent examiners themselves, without 
prompting from supervisors, respond to the profitability implications 
of varying renewal rates and entity size.67 Patent examiners, 
especially senior examiners, may internalize the negative impact of 
budgetary shortfalls to the Agency.68 Thus, patent examiners may 
possess sufficient motivation by themselves to preferentially grant 
patents filed by large entities and high renewal-rate technologies 
relative to others when the PTO’s fee collections are low. 
The rest of this Part proceeds by considering the manner in 
which each of the two above-mentioned characteristics (i.e., renewal 
rates and entity size) bears on the profitability of the PTO’s marginal 
 
 65.  In future work we plan to explore this mechanism in more depth.  
 66.  Once a patent application has been assigned a technology classification, it is then, 
based on its class number, routed to an Art Unit, where it eventually will be examined by a 
patent examiner. Lemley & Sampat, supra note 5, at 818. Art Units may be assigned patent 
applications from one class, a portion of a class, or from several classes involving closely related 
technology. See Patent Classification: Classes Arranged by Art Unit, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/classification/art/index.jsp (last modified Oct. 3, 
2012). Art Units are likewise aggregated into larger parcels that contain anywhere from five to 
fifteen Art Units and are eventually aggregated into one of nine technology centers. Patent 
Technology Centers, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://www.uspto.gov/about/contacts/ 
phone_directory/pat_tech/index.jsp (last modified Feb. 17, 2010) (listing the nine patent 
technology centers within the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office). This hierarchical structure 
creates a situation in which patents of a particular PTO class are consistently examined by a 
targeted population of examiners (i.e., applications within a particular class are not randomly 
assigned among a large number of Art Units; rather, they are assigned to one or a few Art 
Units). This consistency makes it easier for top-level officials within the Agency to coordinate 
with and direct examiners to grant more patents in one technology category (for example, one 
with a higher renewal rate) relative to another category (for example, one with a lower renewal 
rate).  
 67.  Patent examiners may be consciously or subconsciously responding to profit variations 
of patents.  
 68.  Alternatively, patent examiners may be responding to low fee collections by favoring 
certain types of patents over others because they recognize the negative impact of budgetary 
shortfalls to their daily life (e.g., an elimination of overtime). Examiners will most likely respond 
to the differential in fee collections when fees are low, as overtime is most likely to be eliminated 
when the PTO’s financial health is in jeopardy. If this is the dominate mechanism, then low-level 
officials would be acting in a self-interested manner, but the aggregate result would mimic a 
benevolent-but-resource-constrained agency.  
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granting decisions. We then set forth various testable hypotheses 
regarding how the Agency will alter its granting decisions in response 
to these marginal incentives.69 
A.  Renewal Rates 
Once a patent is issued it does not automatically remain in 
force for the duration of its twenty-year patent term.70 The patentee 
must take the affirmative step of paying renewal or maintenance fees 
at three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years 
from the date at which the patent issued to assure the patent’s 
enforceability (referred to as four-year, eight-year, and twelve-year 
maintenance fees in the empirical analysis discussed below). If a 
patentee fails to pay any of these fees, the invention enters the public 
domain.71 Renewal fees currently account for nearly 30% of the PTO’s 
patent budget, while the cost to the Agency to maintain a patent is 
negligible. Thus, such fees are almost exclusively utilized to subsidize 
other agency activity. 
However, not every patent grant generates equal renewal-fee 
revenue. While maintenance fees do not vary across technology 
classifications, patentees elect to pay these fees at dramatically 
different rates across such classifications.72 Accordingly, the PTO 
stands to gain more financially by granting patents in technologies 
that are likely to be renewed at a higher rate relative to those likely to 
be renewed a lower rate.73 Of course, just because the PTO has this 
financial incentive does not necessarily mean the Agency will act on it. 
The latter depends, in part, on the Agency’s primary objectives and its 
needs. The rest of this Section proposes that both a self-interested and 
a benevolent-but-resource-constrained PTO will grant more patents in 
 
 69.  Importantly, besides the harms associated with a bias toward granting patents, any 
distortions in the PTO’s granting patterns across technological fields and entity size may 
likewise distort the allocation of innovation resources in society.  
 70.  This is true only for patents that mature from patent applications filed on or after 
December 12, 1980. 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) (2006) (listing the duration of a patent’s effectiveness and 
the corresponding fees that the Director may charge “for maintaining in force all patents based 
on applications filed on or after December 12, 1980”). This date introduced renewal or 
maintenance fees to the U.S. patent system. Thus, patent applications filed before December 12, 
1980, were automatically enforceable until the end of their patent term. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b).  
 71.  The late payment of any maintenance fee may be accepted if the delay in payment is 
shown to have been “unavoidable.” 35 U.S.C. § 41(c)(1). 
 72.  Renewal-rate differentials hold across technologies both when categorizing technology 
in terms of the PTO’s own classification system and when using more coarsely defined systems. 
See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.  
 73.  Wasserman, supra note 16, at 412.  
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technology categories with high renewal rates relative to patents in 
categories with low renewal rates, albeit for different reasons. 
1. The Self-Interested, Budget-Maximizing PTO 
Given that the PTO is seeking to maximize its budget, how will 
this differential-renewal-fee incentive affect its granting behavior? At 
first glance it might not affect it at all. A budget-maximizing PTO will 
instruct examiners to grant every patent, as the Agency stands to 
profit on each marginal grant from the possibility of the ensuing 
maintenance fees, whether the probability of collecting such fees is low 
or high.74 Of course, a self-interested PTO may not adopt such a 
drastic practice for several reasons, including fear of congressional 
retribution.75 To the extent the PTO believes it can skirt detection, 
and hence punishment, by adopting a less extreme bias toward 
allowing patents, then even a self-interested PTO may distort its 
granting behavior in response to the differential in profits arising from 
technology-wide variations in renewal rates. A self-interested agency 
can maximize the fees it stands to collect for a given distortionary bias 
by focusing this overpatenting tendency on technology categories 
where it stands to profit the most by granting additional patents—
technology categories with high renewal rates. 
Hypothesis 1: Following the adoption of a near fully user-fee-
funded system, a self-interested PTO will grant patents at an 
incrementally higher rate for patents within technology categories that 
generally have high maintenance rates relative to patents within 
categories that generally have low maintenance rates. 
2. The Benevolent-but-Resourced-Constrained PTO 
As discussed in the previous Part, even a benevolent PTO may 
bias examiners toward granting patents in an effort to reestablish 
 
 74.  Examination costs are irrelevant for this marginal profitability assessment given that 
the PTO must examine those applications that are filed and that such examination costs will 
have already been incurred at the time the PTO makes it granting decision. 
 75.  Administrative law scholars have long noted that Congress exerts substantial influence 
over agencies that are funded through discretionary spending, meaning that Congress evaluates 
their budgetary needs annually during the appropriations cycle. See, e.g., RICHARD F. FENNO, 
JR., THE POWER OF THE PURSE: APPROPRIATIONS POLITICS IN CONGRESS 291 (1966) (“Once the 
[Appropriations] Committee’s ability to hurt it is recognized, the most obvious way for the agency 
to ensure a favorable kind of relationship with the Committee is simply to do . . . what the 
Committee tells it to do.”); Bruce Yandle, Regulators, Legislators and Budget Manipulation, 56 
PUB. CHOICE 167, 178 (1988) (“Budget manipulation is the most effective sanction available to 
Congress.”). 
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financial sustainability. However, rather than increase patenting 
across the board, a benevolent PTO in need of additional funds may 
also generally instruct examiners to grant relatively more patents in 
technologies with high renewal rates than patents in technologies 
with low renewal rates.76 Under the assumption of benevolence, the 
PTO will likely wish to limit the degree to which it distorts its 
granting decisions away from what is otherwise optimal policy. As a 
result, a benevolent-but-resource-constrained PTO that is attempting 
to reach a revenue goal would prefer to satisfy this target by granting 
a few extra patents in technology categories with respect to which it 
will profit the most—i.e., those with high maintenance rates—rather 
than a larger number of extra patents in technology categories with 
respect to which it will profit the least—i.e., those with low 
maintenance rates.77 
Hypothesis 2: Following the adoption of a near fully user-fee-
funded system and during times at which a benevolent PTO is resource 
constrained, the PTO will grant patents at an incrementally higher 
rate for patents within technology categories that generally have high 
maintenance rates relative to patents within categories that generally 
have low maintenance rates. 
 
 76.  This analysis, of course, assumes that the PTO knows it will take at least three-and-a-
half years to generate any of these additional revenues. Accordingly, the Agency must anticipate 
that its resource constraints will likely be binding over at least a moderately long period of time. 
Moreover, this analysis also assumes that the current PTO management structure is sufficiently 
forward thinking, even in light of the limited tenure of PTO directors. The director of the PTO is 
nominated by the President and approved by the Senate, and thus the director of the PTO 
changes when the administration in the White House changes. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(1) (2006). 
Nonetheless, other high-level administrators offer significant continuity to the Agency, as these 
bureaucrats tend to have long tenures at the Agency. See § 3. For example, Commissioner Stoll, 
who was commissioner for patents, retired from the PTO at the end of 2011 after twenty-nine 
years of service to the Agency. Press Release, 11-62, Commissioner for Patents Robert Stoll to 
Retire from Government Service After 29 Years at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (Nov. 2, 2011).  
 77.  Assume that a benevolent PTO is seeking to generate an additional $6,800 in fee 
revenue at a future date. In order to accomplish this goal, the Agency is considering granting 
additional patents either in a class that has a 90% renewal rate or a class that has a 10% 
renewal rate. The maintenance-fee income generated, on average, from granting an additional 
patent in each of these classes is $6,813 in the former and only $757 in the latter. Thus, in order 
to meets its revenue target, the PTO can either grant one additional patent in the 90% renewal 
patent class or nine additional patents in the 10% renewal-rate class. This calculation assumes 
the same renewal rate across all three stages of renewal fees. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.20(e)–(g) (2012) 
(listing renewal fees for three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years from the 
date the patent issues of $980, $2,480, and $4,110 respectively). 
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B.  Entity Size 
Small-entity status allows independent inventors, small 
businesses, and nonprofit organizations to pay 50% reduced patent 
fees.78 As a result, the PTO stands to earn twice the amount of post-
allowance fees (i.e., issuance and renewal fees) by granting a patent 
filed by a large entity than by granting a patent filed by a small 
entity.79 Of course, the manner in which the PTO responds to this 
marginal incentive will likely depend on its baseline objectives. The 
rest of this Section outlines the reasons for why both a self-interested 
and a benevolent-but-resource-constrained PTO are likely to grant 
more patents with large-entity designations relative to patents with 
small-entity designations. 
1. The Self-Interested, Budget-Maximizing PTO 
Similar to the maintenance-rate factor, a self-interested PTO 
will be incentivized to always grant patents. Although the Agency 
stands to earn half as much fee revenue by granting a small-entity 
patent versus a large-entity patent, the PTO will still collect some fee 
revenue by granting the former. As discussed above, the Agency is 
unlikely to adopt such an extreme practice. However, if a self-
interested PTO believes it can avert detection and hence punishment 
by adopting a less extreme bias toward allowing patents, then the 
Agency will likely focus this expansionary pressure where it stands to 
earn the biggest returns—large entities. As a result, a self-interested 
PTO will grant relatively more patents filed by large relative to small 
entities. 
Hypothesis 3: Following the adoption of a near fully user-fee-
funded system, a self-interested PTO will grant patents at an 
incrementally higher rate to patent applicants with large-entity status, 
relative to those with small-entity status. 
2. The Benevolent-but-Resourced-Constrained PTO 
A benevolent PTO that is resource constrained will grant more 
patents in an effort to increase revenue. However, desiring to 
minimize deviations from optimal patent policy, the PTO is likely to 
 
 78.  35 U.S.C. § 41(h). A “small” entity is defined by the PTO as individuals, nonprofit 
corporations, or corporations that qualify as small businesses under the Small Business Act. 37 
C.F.R. § 1.27(a)(1)–(3) (2012).  
 79.  Wasserman, supra note 16, at 412 n.129. 
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focus its granting bias on those patents where it stands to profit the 
most by issuing an additional patent. Accordingly, when a benevolent 
PTO is bound by financial constraints, it will grant more patents to 
applicants with large-entity status, relative to those with small-entity 
status. 
Hypothesis 4: Following the adoption of a near fully user-fee-
funded system and during times at which a benevolent PTO is resource 
constrained, the PTO will grant patents at an incrementally higher 
rate to patent applicants with large-entity status, relative to those with 
small-entity status. 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A.  Data Sources and Key Variables 
In order to investigate the manner in which the PTO responds 
to the incentives posed by its fee structure, it is necessary to acquire 
data on the PTO’s granting patterns covering a sufficiently long period 
of time and covering a broad array of patent types. For these purposes, 
we filed Freedom of Information Act requests to the PTO and obtained 
a previously unavailable, comprehensive annual data set on PTO 
patent-processing outcomes for every utility patent application that 
was received at the PTO over the sample period.80 More specifically, 
the patent-processing data contains annual patent filings, allowances, 
and disposals, disaggregated by patent class and entity size.81 The 
 
 80.  For the purposes of this empirical analysis, we focus only on utility patents, especially 
considering that maintenance fees do not apply to design or plant patents. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.20 
(2012). 
 81.  In the data received by the PTO, disposals include patent applications that have been 
allowed and abandoned. Abandoned patent applications include patent applications that have 
been rejected and patent applications that have been abandoned for business reasons. Curiously, 
a patent applicant can elect to “restart” the patent examination process of an application that 
has been rejected by filing a request for continued examination (“RCE”) or by filing a 
continuation application. By restarting the patent examination process, a “finally rejected” 
patent application receives continued examination by the PTO. The PTO data includes a finally 
rejected patent application if an applicant subsequently files a continuation application in its 
disposals. In contrast, the data does not include a finally rejected patent application if an 
applicant subsequently files an RCE in its disposals. Most likely, this difference in accounting 
results from the fact that a patent applicant who files a continuation application files an entirely 
new application, whereas a patent applicant who files an RCE is requesting continued 
prosecution of the existing application. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of 
Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 68 n.14 (2004). As a result, we control for RCE filings 
to alleviate concerns that some patent types are better able to secure ultimate allowances 
through greater usage of RCEs. See infra Section IV.E and Appendix B. 
 In addition, the PTO appears to have little to no financial incentive to encourage the filing of 
continuations. The fees for examining an RCE are set below the examining fees for a new 
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sample collected spans the time period from 1983 to 2010. On average, 
over our sample period, 258,883 patent applications were filed each 
year, 132,181 patents were allowed each year, and 189,660 patent 
applications were disposed of each year. Previous investigations on the 
PTO’s granting patterns have utilized an alternate source that allows 
for the calculation of PTO grant rates across patent types from only 
2001 onwards.82 Our data allows for the calculation of annual PTO 
grant rates across patent types spanning the period of 1983 to the 
present, which in turn makes possible the exploration of the influence 
of the 1991 fee reform on the PTO’s granting behavior. 
More specifically, we use these data to calculate patent grant 
rates specific to given technology-year combinations (e.g., for genetic 
patents in 1995) and specific to given technology-year–entity-size 
combinations. Consistent with the PTO’s own representation of its 
granting practices, we calculate grant rates as the number of patents 
granted by the PTO divided by the number of patent applications 
disposed of by the PTO.83 We categorize technology groups in various 
ways throughout this analysis. In our primary specifications, we 
utilize the technological subcategories (delineating thirty-seven 
different technology groups) specified by Bronwyn Hall, Adam Jaffe, 
and Manuel Trajtenberg and developed for the Patent Data Project of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research.84 
 
application, and the fees for examining a continuation application are the same as a new 
application. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(e) (2012) (showing that in the fiscal year of 2010 the examination 
fees for an RCE were $810 for a large entity and $405 for a small entity). While the PTO 
acknowledges that the cost of examining a continuing application are, on average, less than the 
costs of examining an original application, the savings do not reach the amount required to align 
fees with costs. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DETAILED APPENDICES: PATENT FEE 
PROPOSAL 1, 61 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/fee_setting_-
_ppac_hearing_appendices_7feb12.pdf (showing that the PTO estimates the historical cost of 
examining RCE is approximately $1700); see also Wasserman, supra note 16, at 409–10 (noting 
that “the mismatch in examination fees and examination costs for a patent application are likely 
to increase with each iteration through the examination system”). 
 82.  See, e.g., Lemley & Sampat, supra note 11, at 187–89.  
 83.  See, e.g., EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, JAPANESE PATENT OFFICE, KOREAN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY OFFICE & U. S. PATENT OFFICE, FOUR OFFICE STATISTICS REPORT 2010 (2010), 
available at http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/fosr2010/annex2.pdf. Table A2 of Appendix B 
demonstrates the robustness of the empirical results to the use of alternative grant-rate 
constructions. See also supra note 81 (describing the data received by the PTO). 
 84.  Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent-Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and 
Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS, & INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY 403, 434–37 (Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002). The PTO classifies 
patents into nearly five hundred different technology classes. This classification scheme, 
however, changes somewhat over time as new classes are added or as others are divided. These 
compositional changes (particularly divisions) potentially complicate an empirical analysis that 
tracks within-category changes in PTO behavior over time. For these reasons (and to facilitate a 
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We then merge these data on grant rates with data on 
technology-specific maintenance rates, which capture the likelihoods 
that patents issuing within the relevant category will be renewed by 
the patentee at the respective four-year, eight-year, and twelve-year 
marks following their issuance.85 The primary empirical specifications 
estimated below focus on differentiating across technology categories 
based on the likelihood of renewing patents at the four-year mark; 
however the empirical results are robust to alternative approaches 
that focus on eight-year or twelve-year rates or on some combination 
of the three rates, as demonstrated by Table A2 in Appendix B. 
Appendix A provides further details on the construction of the 
estimation sample and of the relevant variables employed in the 
empirical analysis. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables 
used in the regression analysis. The PTO has granted or allowed 
roughly 70% of the total patents that it has disposed of over the 
sample period.86 Applications from inventors with small-entity status 
represent roughly 29% of the total number of application filings. 
Roughly 85% of those patents eligible for renewal at the four-year 
mark, in fact, renewed their patents. In Appendix A, we provide a 
breakdown of the maintenance rates and incidence of small entities 
for each technology category. This breakdown evidences meaningful 
variation in renewal rates across categories, providing support not 
only for the methodological framework discussed below, which relies 
 
more manageable regression framework), in our preferred specifications we group patents into 
the relatively coarser technology classification system set forth by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg. 
As demonstrated by Table A2 of Appendix B, however, the results are nearly identical when 
using regression specifications based on the PTO classifications themselves. In any event, this 
approach may constitute a more appropriate specification to the extent that the PTO elects to 
differentiate its granting practices (as hypothesized) at a relatively coarser level. Moreover, if the 
PTO does indeed differentiate all the way to the PTO classification level, any such differential 
response should still be observable at the more aggregated level assuming some amount of 
correlation of profitability characteristics (e.g., maintenance rates) across PTO classes within 
National Bureau of Economic Research (“NBER”) subcategories, as is borne out by the data. 
 85.  For each patent issued following September 1, 1981, the PTO collects detailed log data 
on all maintenance events for the relevant patent, including, for example, the payment of its 
four-year renewal fee or the termination of the patent for the failure to pay its due four-year 
renewal fee. See Patent Maintenance Fees (.zip) and Description Files (.txt) (September 1, 1981 – 
Present), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://eipweb.uspto.gov/MaintFeeEvents (last modified 
Oct. 25, 2012) (providing publically available data).  
 86.  As the data received by the PTO includes a finally rejected patent application if an 
applicant subsequently files a continuation application as a disposal, our grant rates do not 
represent the chances that an originally filed application will issue. Importantly, our analysis 
does not depend on this calculation, as we are interested in studying the influence of the PTO’s 
fee structure on its granting behavior, not the chances an originally filed application will be 
allowed.  
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upon this variation, but also in the predicted sensitivity of PTO grant 
rates to its fee structure.87 
 
TABLE 1: MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF SELECTED VARIABLES 
 (1) 
Panel A. Averaged Across Patent Category / Year Combinations 
 
Patent Grant Rate (%, Allowances / Disposals) 70.21 
(13.71) 
Patent Allowances (1,000’s) 6.75 
(5.09) 
Four-Year Maintenance Rate (%) 84.74 
(5.09) 
Eight-Year Maintenance Rate (%) 63.48 
(8.82) 
Twelve-Year Maintenance Rate (%) 43.70 
(8.94) 
Small-Entity Status Rate (%, Small-Entity 
Applications / Total Applications)  
28.52 
(15.28) 
Panel B. Aggregate PTO Measures, Averaged Across Years 
 
Fee-Diversion Policy (% Incidence) 50.00 
(50.92) 
Sustainability Score 0.40 
(0.11) 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. Descriptive statistics are from a sample of 
1,058 technology category / year cells from 1983 to 2010 in Panel A and from a sample 
of twenty-eight years in Panel B. The statistics presented in Panel A are weighted by 
the relevant number of patent disposals associated with each category-year cell, while 
those in Panel B are unweighted. The definition of each variable is set forth in greater 
detail in Appendix A. 
 
 
 87.  See infra Table A1 in Appendix A (demonstrating the average maintenance rates across 
each of the thirty-seven technological categories considered in this empirical analysis). Averaging 
over the entire sample period, four-year maintenance rates, for instance, span from roughly 
69.5% at the lowest to 93.4% at the highest.  
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Likewise, grant rates demonstrate a meaningful level of 
variation across technology categories and across years, with a 
standard deviation of 13.7 relative to its mean of 70.2 (with over 30% 
of this variation reflecting changes in grant rates within patent 
categories over time).88 How much of this variation can be explained 
by the imposition of the PTO’s current fee structure and by variations 
in the PTO’s financial strength? We now turn to an explanation of the 
methodological approach undertaken to investigate these questions. 
B.  Methodology 
1.  Difference-in-Difference Analysis 
In order to statistically tease out the relationship between the 
PTO’s fee structure and its grant rates, we embrace the existence of a 
“natural experiment” made possible by the Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act of 1990, which became effective in 1991. This reform resulted in a 
roughly 70% increase in the fees assessed by the PTO and, for the first 
time, left the PTO essentially fully funded by user fees.89 By observing 
the PTO’s granting practices before and after a reform that put into 
place its current funding structure, we hope to gain an understanding 
of how this structure affects the foremost decision with which the 
Agency is tasked: whether or not to grant a patent. 
Of course, simply observing the change in overall PTO grant 
rates before and after this reform in an effort to explore the impact of 
the reform would be highly problematic. Grant rates are almost 
certain to change over time for reasons unrelated to the financial 
incentives facing the PTO—e.g., changes in the quality of underlying 
applications. Indeed, the predictions set forth in Part II do not dictate 
that the PTO’s grant rates will, in an absolute sense, clearly increase 
subsequent to the fee reform and during times of strongly binding 
financial constraints. Rather, the theory predicts that the PTO’s grant 
rates will be higher than they otherwise would be absent the presence 
 
 88.  It is technically this within-class variation in grant rates over time that is the target of 
our regression analysis. By including what are called category “fixed effects” we allow for 
completely fixed differences in grant rates over time across the categories. We ask whether grant 
rates increase following the 1991 reform within our treatment categories, subtracting out the 
corresponding within-category changes in grant rates for the control categories (e.g., low 
maintenance rate categories) in order to isolate the effect of the fee reform.  
 89.  Prior to this time, the PTO met roughly half of its obligations through the collection of 
user fees. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1992, at 53 tbl.2 
(1993).  
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of the fee reform and/or the financial constraints.90 The possibility that 
other factors may drive grant rates leaves it difficult statistically to 
disentangle the marginal influence of the fee-structure reform from 
the impact of changes in these other factors over time (absent 
observable data on all such other factors). To surmount this problem, 
we utilize a “difference-in-difference” estimation approach 
(implemented via regression analysis) that is commonly employed by 
policy evaluation studies in the economics and law and economics 
literatures. 
The essential premise behind the difference-in-difference 
approach is to observe how grant rates change before and after the 
1991 reform for a set of patents with respect to which the PTO is not 
likely to exhibit an expansionary responsiveness between grant rates 
and fee structure (e.g., those with low maintenance rates). To the 
extent that the grant rates associated with patents of this latter type 
are likewise impacted by those unobservable drivers of PTO behavior, 
one can view this set of patents as a “control” group. As such, one can 
effectively use the change in grant rates around the 1991 fee reform 
for this control group as an estimate for the influence of the change 
over time in these unobservable drivers. Thereafter, one can subtract 
this estimate from the corresponding estimate of the change in grant 
rates before and after the 1991 reform on the set of patents for which 
one would expect a responsiveness between grant rates and fee 
structure—i.e., the treatment group. This calculation should provide 
us with the desired disentangling of factors and thus leave us with an 
unbiased estimate of the true impact of the reform itself on PTO 
granting practices. 
To execute this empirical approach and to form the necessary 
treatment and control groups, we draw on the theoretical predictions 
from Part II regarding which types of patents are associated with 
grant rates that are more or less likely to be sensitive to fee structure. 
Embracing each of the predictions set forth in Part II, we test for 
various differential responses to the 1991 reform across different types 
of patents—e.g., across large and small entities. Under the 
 
 90.  For instance, if other, unrelated factors are driving a downward trend in PTO grant 
rates, the theory predicts that the influence of fees and/or financial constraints may cause that 
trend to be less severe than it otherwise would be. Moreover, even if, in absolute terms, grant 
rates are not rising over time, it may still be the case that the marginal increase in patent grant 
rates that otherwise does ensue from these fee influences could be detrimental to innovation 
policy. After all, such influences could be disrupting what is otherwise a rational and optimal 
downward trend in granting policies. The focus of this Article is on that marginal, fee-related 
distortion itself.  
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fundamental assumption that, absent the reform, each patent type 
would have continued along the same trajectory (not necessarily at the 
same level, though), this exercise allows us to evaluate the general 
motivating question of this Article: does the PTO distort its granting 
practices in an expansionary manner in response to its fee-based 
incentives? 
It is worth emphasizing that this approach accounts for the 
possibility of completely fixed differences in grant rates across patent 
types—i.e., inherent differences across types that are present across 
all sample years. After all, to use entity size as an example, our 
analysis is not simply comparing large- and small-entity grant rates. 
Rather, we are comparing how the change in large-entity grant rates 
before and after 1991 compares to the corresponding change in small-
entity grant rates before and after 1991. As such, by focusing on this 
difference-in-difference calculation, we allow for the possibility that 
there is something fundamentally unique about the granting 
likelihoods facing large entities relative to small entities (i.e., the 
possibility that large entities garner a higher grant rate than small 
entities because the former has access to higher-quality attorneys or 
because the former has better internal screening mechanisms 
regarding the patentability of their inventions). It is also worth 
emphasizing that this empirical exercise does not rule out the 
possibility of other Agency-level and examiner-level biases in behavior 
(e.g., examiner biases ensuing from their compensation structure). 
Rather, the design is simply meant to isolate the particular bias 
stemming from the Agency’s fee structure. 
In reality, the empirical specifications that we estimate below 
are a bit richer than the simple difference-in-difference description set 
forth above, though that description does capture its key intuitions. In 
Appendix A we provide more details regarding the precise empirical 
specifications that we estimate. For instance, rather than forming one 
treatment group and one control group, many of our empirical 
approaches consider a continuum of patent types (e.g., differentiating 
technology categories based on a measure of their four-year 
maintenance rates) and then observe how the PTO’s practices respond 
to the 1991 reform as we move along this continuum.91 
 
 91.  While numerous examples exist, the primary empirical precedent that we follow in this 
Article is Daron Acemoglu and Amy Finkelstein’s investigation into the differential change in the 
capital-labor ratio of hospitals following the national adoption of the Medicare Prospective 
Payment System (PPS) in 1984, where hospitals are differentiated (and theorized to respond 
differently to the adoption of PPS) based on their pre-reform share of Medicare patient days. 
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Of course, while the difference-in-difference approach holds the 
promise of isolating the marginal effect of the PTO’s fee structure on 
its grant rates, it does rely on various assumptions and thus carries 
various caveats. For instance, if those separate patent types that are 
predicted to be responsive and nonresponsive, respectively, to the 
patent fee structure already happen to be on divergent trends in their 
granting patterns prior to the fee reform, then the basic difference-in-
difference results may be picking up the influence of these preexisting 
trends, as opposed to the influence of the reform itself. Fortunately, 
we will be able to look for various markers of this potentially 
confounding story, as will be discussed in the results section below. 
More generally, in a series of so-called “specification checks,” we 
challenge the various assumptions underlying the baseline empirical 
approaches and demonstrate the flexibility and the robustness of the 
findings to a range of alternative approaches. 
2.  Financial-Sustainability Analysis 
Our regression analysis exploits sources of variations beyond 
that of mere time (before and after 1991) and patent type (e.g., large 
vs. small entity). Integral to our empirical analysis is also the 
consideration of variations over time in the degree to which the PTO is 
bound by its financial constraints and likely to be in need of additional 
sources of revenue. As predicted in Part I, under the assumption of 
benevolence, the PTO may only be expected to respond to fee 
incentives by granting differentially across patent types during times 
in which such constraints are binding. In order to test this prediction, 
we modify the basic regression approach discussed above and 
effectively explore whether the primary difference-in-difference 
finding is itself likely to emerge to a stronger degree during times in 
which markers indicative of PTO revenue need are more prevalent. 
For these purposes, we draw upon the theory set forth in Part I, 
whereby we predicted that the PTO would be more likely to trigger its 
sustainability constraint upon a change in various factors, including 
an increase in its backlog, a decrease in its annual renewal-fee 
collections, an increase in the average complexity of its examinations, 
and a decrease in the proportion of large-entity patentees. Each such 
development would disrupt any financial balance reached and 
decrease the proportion of incoming fees to outgoing costs. 
 
Daron Acemoglu & Amy Finkelstein, Input and Technology Choices in Regulated Industries: 
Evidence from the Health Care Sector, 116 J. POL. ECON. 837 (2008). 
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In Table A8 of Appendix B, we estimate regressions that 
explore how fluctuations over time in each of these separate factors 
are associated with a differential grant rate across the delineated 
patent types. Of course, in any given year, all of these factors are 
changing at the same time, even though the PTO is only subject to a 
single sustainability constraint. In other words, in a given year, the 
PTO may experience an X% increase in its backlog, which will leave it 
more likely to face break-even concerns, along with a Y% increase in 
aggregate renewal rates, which will leave it less likely to face such 
concerns. These separate regressions alone leave us unable to 
determine how to weigh the respective influences of each such 
development upon the PTO’s aggregate financial strength and thus 
upon its ultimate decisionmaking. Therefore, in our primary approach 
to testing this sustainability prediction, which we undertake in Part 
IV below, we combine these factors into a composite sustainability 
measure. This “sustainability score” is constructed so as to capture the 
impact of these factors on the PTO’s financial balance in a manner 
consistent with the empirically relevant influence of each such factor. 
To this end, we use actual data on the annual fluctuations in the 
above factors (e.g., annual maintenance rates, backlog levels, etc.), 
along with information on the parameters of the PTO’s fee schedule, to 
simulate an annual measure equal to the ratio between (1) the 
issuance and post-issuance fees generated by the existing stock of 
patents at a given point in time and (2) the net costs associated with 
the examinations demanded of the PTO at that time.92 Appendix A 
provides further specifics regarding this calculation. A higher 
simulated sustainability score is suggestive of fewer financial 
pressures facing the PTO and thus less need of additional funds. 
In calculating this sustainability metric, we proxy the 
examination demand facing the PTO in a given year by the PTO’s 
backlog of patent examinations at that time.93 Of course, the PTO does 
 
 92.  This calculation also draws upon information on the history of patent issuances over 
time, which bears, for instance, on the number of patents up for renewal during the given year. 
In rough terms, multiplying these numbers by the annual renewal rates and by the associated 
renewal fees allows us to estimate the amount of issuance and post-issuance fees that were made 
available to the PTO during the given year. See infra Appendix A. 
 93.  Using annual disposal counts to proxy for this demand is less preferred considering 
that disposals are under the PTO’s control and could be seen as a reflection of the PTO’s 
response to the demands it faces, as opposed to a reflection of the underlying, external cost 
pressures being placed upon the PTO. In rough terms, we estimate the net costs associated with 
all of the examinations demanded upon the PTO for a given year by multiplying the backlog by 
the average costs of examination for that year, where this average is influenced by the 
distribution of applications across the various examination complexity levels for that year (that 
is, certain technologies are allocated more hours of examination and thus carry greater 
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not need to examine its entire backlog each year. Nonetheless, it 
might be reasonable to assume, especially considering the PTO’s own 
rhetoric,94 that the Agency is nonetheless motivated by its mission to 
increase disposals in the face of a large and growing backlog. As such, 
the calculated sustainability score may provide a sense of the ease by 
which the PTO may use its stream of incoming funds to satisfy the 
substantial costs associated with all of those examinations presently 
awaiting the PTO. 
This exercise of exploring whether the PTO’s distortionary 
practices are more pronounced during times of greater financial need 
allows for an appropriate specification of the PTO’s predicted behavior 
under the benevolent model. At the same time, this approach also 
allows us to shed light on an ongoing debate in administrative law 
regarding the nature of government employees: are PTO bureaucrats 
acting in self-interest to universally expand the Agency’s budget or are 
PTO bureaucrats acting with optimal innovation policy in mind, 
though occasionally bound to distort the Agency’s behavior in pursuit 
of required resources? 
IV. RESULTS 
The regression results presented in Table 2 illuminate and test 
the key hypotheses presented in Part II above. Generally, these 
hypotheses set forth that the PTO’s fee structure causes it to increase 
the rate at which it grants patent types that generate higher back-end 
fees relative to the rate at which it grants patent types that generate 
lower back-end fees. This differential analysis sheds light on the 
broader and more fundamental question motivating this paper: does 
the PTO’s fee structure create a bias toward granting patents? We 
begin in Panel A of Table 2 with an analysis of the PTO’s differential 
 
examination costs, in which event average examination costs for a given year depend upon the 
distribution of applications across technologies for that year). See infra Appendix A (offering 
more detail). The sustainability score is not meant to reflect the actual profits accruing to the 
PTO in a given year. Rather, it is meant to simulate how variations in the above-mentioned 
factors (keeping all other factors fixed) affect its general profitability. That is, it provides a 
meaningful and empirically relevant way of assessing the relative contributions to the PTO’s 
financial position—i.e., its balance of incoming fees to outgoing costs—of each of these factors. If 
the backlog happens to grow by 40% over a given year, while annual renewal rates increase by 
5% over that year, this calculation allows for an appropriately greater emphasis to be placed 
upon the backlog growth in assessing the PTO’s need for funds. 
 94.  2011 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 112 (stating that 
the Inspector General’s top management challenges facing the PTO include “reducing the patent 
application backlog”); 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 (“The 
Agency continues to face operational challenges including . . . a large backlog.”). 
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response to its fee structure across technology categories with varying 
renewal rates.95 
A.  Difference-in-Difference Results: Renewal Rate Specifications 
To recap, in Part II, we set forth the following testable 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Following the adoption of a near fully user-fee-
funded system, a self-interested PTO will grant patents at an 
incrementally higher rate for patents within technology categories that 
generally have high maintenance rates relative to patents within 
categories that generally have low maintenance rates. 
Hypothesis 2: Following the adoption of a near fully user-fee-
funded system and during times at which a benevolent PTO is resource 
constrained, the PTO will grant patents at an incrementally higher 
rate for patents within technology categories that generally have high 
maintenance rates relative to patents within categories that generally 
have low maintenance rates. 
1.  Primary Difference-in-Difference Results 
The results presented in Panel A of Table 2 are consistent with 
the general prediction that the PTO would, following the adoption of a 
fully user-fee-funded system, grant at an incrementally higher rate to 
patents within high-maintenance-rate categories relative to those 
within low-maintenance-rate categories. The coefficient estimate 
presented in Column 1 of Panel A captures the relationship between 
the PTO’s grant rate and the interaction between being in the post-
reform period (“REFORM”) and being in a high-maintenance-rate 
category (“MAINTAIN”). More specifically, the estimated figure of 
58.96 suggests that the impact of the 1991 reform on the PTO grant 
rate is fifty-nine percentage points higher (or roughly 84% higher) for 
a patent category with a maintenance rate of 100% than it is for a 
category with a 0% maintenance rate and likewise, 5.9 percentage 
 
 95.  As discussed in Part III above, we classify patents into the thirty-seven technological 
subcategories set forth by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, supra note 84. As demonstrated in Table 
A2 of Appendix B, however, the pattern of results presented in Table 2 remains virtually 
unchanged when we use alternative classification schemes, including the more fine-grained PTO 
Classification System and the broader six-category-level system likewise introduced by Hall, 
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg. 
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points higher for a category with a maintenance rate of X% relative to 
one with a rate of X-10%.96 
This latter interpretation—i.e., the 5.9 percentage-point 
differential—is perhaps a more meaningful description of the findings 
considering that technology categories simply do not differ by 100 
percentage points in their maintenance rates.97 The standard 
deviation in four-year maintenance rates across technology categories 
(unweighted) is roughly six percentage points, with a low maintenance 
rate of roughly 62% (amusement devices) and a high of roughly 94% 
(semiconductors).98 The underlying regression estimated in Panel A 
explores the differential response to the 1991 reform along a linear 
continuum of maintenance rates (by interacting the binary reform 
variable with a continuous maintenance-rate measure). In Table A4 of 
Appendix B, we relax the assumption of linearity and estimate a less 
parametric specification that assigns technology categories 
dichotomous (0/1) variables for being in different quartiles (e.g., top 
 
 96. We do not begin the sample period used in the maintenance-rate regressions until 1987. 
By that time frame, both the PTO and the industry players will have acquired some experience 
with the renewal payment process (maintenance fees originated with patents issued at least 
after September 1981). This will allow us to evaluate how the steady-state experience of a PTO 
with a renewal system in place responds to the 1991 fee reform. One might be concerned that the 
reflection on the initial experience with maintenance fee payments led to certain immediate 
behavioral changes that impacted relative grant rates across high-renewal and low-renewal 
technology groups. For instance, consider a technology that is inclined to renew at a low rate. 
Upon the imposition of the renewal system, one might expect that this industry would begin to 
file applications at marginally lower rates, focusing this reduction on low-quality applications. A 
response of this nature, in light of a more selective application pool, could lead to the observation 
of a jump in grant rates for low renewal-rate technologies relative to high renewal-rate 
technologies. This response may occur both during the initial imposition of the renewal system 
and subsequently following the first experience with the renewal payment decision itself. In fact, 
the data do suggest a pattern of this nature at both such times. The results of our analysis are 
entirely robust to beginning our sample period in these earlier years. Of course, the 1991-fee-
reform results are not likely to be severely jeopardized by this initial response to the 
maintenance-fee-paying experience considering that this initial response ran counter to the 
predicted response of the 1991 fee reform and could thus not serve as a competing explanation 
for our primary results. In any event, to avoid this initial calibration and to more cleanly identify 
the impact of the fee reform of interest, we elect to begin the sample in the period of time after 
all parties have had the opportunity to experience at least a year or two of the renewal payment 
process.   
 97.  Panel A simply interprets the findings along such drastic extremes considering that the 
MAINTAIN variable is defined in fractional terms (thus ranging from 0 to 1 in value) and that 
coefficients of regressors are typically interpreted as the change in the dependent variable 
associated with a one-point change in the regressor.  
 98.  This range is based on the preferred specification of the 4-year maintenance rates, 
which are determined according to the average rates experienced across technology categories up 
to 1990.  See infra Appendix A.  As such, this range differs slightly from that reported in Table 
A1 (see infra Appendix A), which reports average maintenance rates experienced over all sample 
years.   
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25%, bottom 25%, etc.) of maintenance rates. We find a roughly 6.8 
percentage-point differential grant-rate response to the 1991 reform 
between technologies in the top and bottom quartiles of maintenance 
rates. 
 
TABLE 2. THE IMPACT OF PTO FEE REFORMS ON GRANT RATES: 
PRIMARY DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Differential Impact of Fee Reform Across Patent Categories with Varying 
Maintenance Rates (unit of observation: Category / Year; dependent variable: 
category-year-specific grant rate) 








     






     
REFORM * MAINTAINi * 
DIVERSION 




     
 Number of observations 887 887 887 887 
Panel B. Differential Impact of Fee Reform Between Patents with Large- and Small-
Entity Status (unit of observation: Category / Year / Entity Size; dependent variable: 
category–year–entity-size–specific grant rate) 








     






     




     
 Number of observations 1843 1843 1843 1843 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses and are clustered to correct for autocorrelation within patent categories over time 
(Panel A) and for autocorrelation within patent-category / entity-size combinations over time 
(Panel B). All regressions include patent-category fixed effects and year fixed effects to control 
for fixed differences in grant rates across patent categories and across years, respectively. 
Regressions in Panel B include entity-size fixed effects as well. Regressions are weighted by the 
number of disposals used to form each observation’s grant rate. Data on patent-processing 
statistics and maintenance rates were obtained from the PTO. 
2b. FrakesWasserman_PAGE01112013 (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2013  11:57 AM 
2013] PTO’S GRANTING PATTERNS 105 
 
Under an assumption that the PTO’s granting patterns for 
high-maintenance-rate categories would otherwise have trended in the 
same manner as for low-maintenance-rate categories absent the 
reform (though still allowing for inherently fixed differences in grant 
rates across technologies), the estimated difference-in-difference 
findings can be interpreted as an expansionary effect of the fee reform 
itself and thus of the user-fee-funded fee structure imposed by the 
reform. In other words, the above estimate can be treated as causal in 
nature under an assumption that there are no unobservable “shocks” 
to the PTO’s granting practices that are specific to high-maintenance-
rate categories in the post-1991 period. We relax, and further explore 
the validity of, this assumption in various ways in Section D and 
Appendix B below. For instance, among others things, we demonstrate 
that the PTO had not already begun these differential granting 
patterns during the period of time prior to the reform, a finding that 
would have otherwise raised concerns that some unobservable factor 
other than the reform is responsible for the findings. 
Of course, observing the differential response to the fee reform 
across technologies with different renewal rates does more than 
simply allow us to tell a potentially causal story (under the above 
assumptions). This differential response represents immediate policy 
concerns in its own right. That is, by possibly inducing the PTO to 
extend preferential treatment to some technologies over others, the 
PTO’s fee structure may be undesirably distorting the allocation of 
resources across different sectors of the economy. 
2.  Sustainability-Interaction Results 
According to the theory set forth in Parts I and II, a self-
interested PTO aiming to either maximize its budget or its profits 
would always be expected to act upon the incentives created by its fee 
structure. On the other hand, our model suggests that a benevolent 
PTO would only elect to grant additional patents in an effort to earn 
extra revenues during periods of time in which it is likely to be 
resource constrained. As such, to more completely test the predictions 
of the benevolent-PTO model, we modify the empirical specifications 
estimated in Column 1 to interact the primary difference-in-difference 
variable with a metric (i.e., the sustainability score described in Part 
III) capturing the likelihood that the PTO is on strong financial 
ground. 
The coefficient on this interaction variable—i.e., in Panel A of 
Table 2, the REFORM * MAINTAIN * SUSTAINABILITY variable—
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provides us with an indication of whether the differential grant-rate 
response to the 1991 reform between high- and low-maintenance-rate 
categories is itself likely to be greater during periods of time in which 
the PTO is subject to heightened financial sustainability concerns. A 
greater differential response of this nature would be identified by the 
estimation of a negative coefficient on this interaction variable 
considering that the sustainability score is defined such that a higher 
score entails a stronger financial position of the PTO. Consistent with 
this prediction, we estimate that as the sustainability score increases 
by 0.1 (or roughly a 25% improvement in the financial position of the 
PTO), the differential response to the 1991 reform between a 100% 
maintenance-rate category and a 0% maintenance-rate category is 
itself expected to fall by roughly twenty-nine percentage points. 
While Column 2 explores whether the differential response to 
the fee reform is stronger during times of more financial stress, we 
also estimate empirical specifications that de-emphasize the 1991 
reform and that directly specify a difference-in-difference analysis 
based only on variations over time in the PTO’s financial 
sustainability score, focusing only on the post-1991-reform period. 
That is, we also estimate specifications that test whether the PTO 
begins to grant patents at an incrementally higher rate to high-
maintenance-rate technologies relative to low-maintenance-rate 
technologies as the PTO experiences a change in conditions that 
leaves it more likely to face sustainability concerns. One, of course, 
needs some variation in the PTO’s fee structure to statistically tease 
out the impact of that structure. This alternative conceptualization of 
the basic difference-in-difference design is premised on the idea that 
we may gain a better understanding of the impact of the PTO’s fee 
structure by exploring variations in the conditions under which the 
PTO would even be sensitive to that structure in the first place. 
We present results of this alternative specification of the 
primary difference-in-difference approach in Table A6 of Appendix B. 
The findings completely match those of Column 2 in suggesting that 
the PTO is more likely to distort its behavior when it is in greater 
need of funds. For instance, we estimate that, as the sustainability 
score decreases by 0.1 (representing a 25% decline in the PTO’s 
financial sustainability position), the PTO begins to grant patents at a 
29.2 percentage-point higher rate for patents within a technology 
category with a maintenance rate of 100% relative to patents within a 
category with a 0% maintenance rate. This finding can likewise be 
interpreted as an effect ensuing from the PTO’s fee structure under an 
assumption that there are no unobservable shocks to the PTO’s grant 
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rates for high-maintenance-rate technologies that coincide with 
declines in the PTO’s financial health. 
All told, it appears that the PTO is not universally seeking to 
expand its revenues in response to the incentives created by its user-
fee-funded structure. Rather, it may tend to use its granting practices 
as a revenue-generating tool only when necessary to sustain itself. We 
demonstrate this finding more clearly and on a year-to-year basis in 
Section D below in discussing the results of a dynamic difference-in-
difference regression. In addition to confirming the predictions of the 
benevolent-but-constrained PTO model, these findings likewise shed 
light on the initial and more fundamental question of whether the 
PTO is indeed self-interested or benevolent in motivation, arguably 
providing support for those theories that have challenged the 
Niskanen model.99 
Accordingly, the findings presented in Panel A of Table 2 do not 
lend support to Hypothesis 1, in so far as they are generally 
inconsistent with the characterization of the PTO as being a self-
interested, budget-maximizing agency. However, the findings are 
consistent with Hypothesis 2 in suggesting the PTO’s fee structure 
induces the Agency to grant at an incrementally higher rate to high-
renewal-rate technologies. 
B.  Difference-in-Difference Results: Entity-Size Specifications 
To recap, in Part II, we set forth the following testable 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Following the adoption of a near fully user-fee-
funded system, a self-interested PTO will grant patents at an 
incrementally higher rate to patent applicants with large-entity status, 
relative to those with small-entity status. 
Hypothesis 4: Following the adoption of a near fully user-fee-
funded system and during times at which a benevolent PTO is resource 
constrained, the PTO will grant patents at an incrementally higher 
rate to patent applicants with large-entity status, relative to those with 
small-entity status. 
1.  Primary Difference-in-Difference Results 
Similar to the maintenance-rate results discussed above, the 
results presented in Panel B of Table 2 are consistent with the 
 
 99.  See supra Section I.B.1. 
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prediction that the PTO would respond to the adoption of a fully user-
fee-funded system by granting at an incrementally higher rate to 
patent applicants with large-entity status, relative to those with 
small-entity status.100 The coefficient estimate reported in Column 1 of 
Panel B suggests that the 1991 fee reform is associated with a 6.4 
percentage-point higher grant rate for large entities relative to small 
entities. Considering a mean grant rate of 70% over the sample period, 
this corresponds to a roughly 9% higher grant rate for large entities.101 
As above, under an assumption that large and small entities would 
have otherwise followed a similar trend over time absent the reform 
(though, still allowing for completely fixed differences in granting 
patterns between large and small entities), this finding is suggestive 
of an effect of the reform itself and thus of a bias toward granting 
additional patents induced by the Agency’s fee structure. 
In finding that the 1991 reform is associated with a 
preferential grant rate for large entities, which pay double the fees of 
small entities, we provide general support for the contention that the 
PTO’s fee structure induces a bias toward granting patents. As with 
the maintenance-rate results, this differential response also raises 
policy concerns of its own and suggests that the effect of extending 
lower fees to small entities may be to undermine the very purpose of 
that fee differential in the first instance—i.e., to foster innovation 
among small firms and individual entrepreneurs.102 
 
 100.  While this underlying regression considers differences in grant rates over time (before 
and after 1991) and across entity sizes (large and small), it also includes technology-specific fixed 
effects. See infra Appendix A (providing further discussion). By accounting for fixed and inherent 
differences across technologies (and knowing grant rates at a level specific to given years, entity 
sizes, and technologies), we can alleviate concerns that the estimated findings are attributable to 
a scenario in which the incidence of large-entity patentees increases over time within technology 
categories that happen to experience higher grant rates historically. 
 In late 1982, Congress, for the first time, set differential fees based on small- versus large-
entity-size distinctions. Act of Aug. 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-247, § 1, 96 Stat. 317. This discount 
for small entities was eventually made permanent. Act of Nov. 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-607, § 
1(b)(2), 100 Stat. 3470 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2006)). Accordingly, we set 1986 
as the beginning of the sample period for the small-entity regressions; however, the results 
remain virtually unchanged when we begin the estimation sample in 1983. 
 101.  See also infra Table A2 in Appendix B (finding virtually identical results for this entity-
size interaction coefficient when we include controls for maintenance rates at the entity-size–
category-specific level, confirming that the estimated differential granting trend between large 
and small entities following the 1991 reform is likely a result of the higher (i.e., double) fees 
ensuing from the large-entity status and not a result of the possibility that large entities also 
happen to maintain their patents at higher rates).  
 102.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Sustainability-Interaction Results 
Consistent with the maintenance-rate results, we likewise find 
that as the sustainability score increases (representing an 
improvement in the PTO’s financial status), the differential response 
to the 1991 reform between large and small entities falls, as evidenced 
by the negative estimate of the coefficient on the REFORM * LARGE * 
SUSTAINABILITY interaction term presented in Column 2 of Panel 
B. Again, this suggests that the PTO may not be universally 
increasing its grant rates in order to maximize fee revenues. Rather, it 
appears that the PTO distorts its behavior so as to increase grant 
rates to large entities (which generate higher fees) to a greater degree 
during times in which the PTO is in greater need of funds.103 
Accordingly, as with the maintenance-rate findings, the results 
presented in Panel B of Table 2 do not lend support to Hypothesis 3, in 
so far as they are generally inconsistent with the characterization of 
the PTO as being a self-interested, budget-maximizing agency. 
However, the findings are consistent with Hypothesis 4 in suggesting 
the PTO’s fee structure induces the Agency to grant at an 
incrementally higher rate to high-renewal-rate technologies. 
C.  Interactions with Fee-Diversion Policy 
As indicated in Part I above, between the years of 1991 and 
2003, the PTO was subject to policies that effectively forced it to share 
a portion of its anticipated fee collections with Congress, an event that 
is often labeled as “fee diversion.” The practice of fee diversion and the 
consequent division of anticipated collections with Congress may blunt 
the incentives of the PTO to increase its grant rates in an effort to 
generate greater revenues. Consider the year 2002, for instance. While 
the PTO projected it would collect roughly $1.35 billion over that year, 
Congress only authorized a budget of $1.05 billion.104 Accordingly, 
Congress’s inclinations to limit the PTO’s funding availability in 2002, 
in turn, may have likely left the PTO less inclined to push Congress 
 
 103.  See also infra Table A6 in Appendix B (estimating an alternative difference-in-
difference specification that focuses only on the post-1991 period and simply explores whether 
the PTO increases its grant rate to large entities relative to small entities during times in which 
the PTO faces greater financial pressures—i.e., during times in which its sustainability score 
falls). Again, the estimates of this exercise match those of the results presented in Column 2 of 
Panel B, which interact the fee-reform-based difference-in-difference variable with the 
sustainability score. 
 104.  See supra note 28. 
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for an even higher budget that year and thus less inclined to seek an 
expansion in its grant rates to justify a higher budget. 
Following 2004, on the other hand, Congress neither 
automatically diverted a percentage of the fees collected (as it did 
between 1991 and 1998) nor capped the PTO’s budget at an amount 
less than its anticipated collections (as it did between 1999 and 2003). 
Rather, the PTO’s spending authority was capped at its projected 
revenue stream, thereby maintaining a possible incentive of the PTO 
to seek an expanded grant rate during those years and a 
correspondingly higher anticipated revenue amount. We test these 
predictions in Column 3 of Table 2. Similar to the sustainability-
interaction specifications, we explore whether the differential 
response to the 1991 reform across different patent types is, in turn, 
weaker during those years (i.e., 1991–2003) in which a stronger fee-
diversion policy was in place. Consistent with these expectations, the 
results presented in Column 3 suggest that during periods of a strong 
fee-diversion policy relative to a weak one, there will be a smaller fee-
induced divergence in PTO grant rates across varying maintenance-
rate categories and between large and small entities.105 While the 
practice of fee diversion may be undesirable from a number of policy 
perspectives, it may nonetheless blunt the grant-related distortions 
that arise from the PTO’s user-fee-funded structure. 
D.  Dynamic Difference-in-Difference Regression Results 
Our empirical specifications allow for completely fixed 
differences in grant rates across years and patent categories (in 
Panels A and B) and likewise across entity-size specifications (in 
Panel B). However, a concern arises that the primary difference-in-
difference result is merely reflective of a preexisting differential 
granting trend between, for instance, large and small entities, as 
opposed to being attributable to an actual effect of the fee reform 
itself. To help rule out this possibility, we estimate dynamic 
difference-in-difference regressions, which modify the approaches 
taken thus far to now interact the categorical distinctions in patent 
 
 105.  In Column 4 of Table 2, we attempt to disentangle the fee-diversion and sustainability 
stories by including both sets of interactions in the same regression, an exercise complicated by 
the significant collinearity between these two factors. While the estimated coefficients of the 
interaction terms fall in magnitude and precision, the findings remain suggestive that the 
differential granting patterns induced across patent types by the 1991 reform are themselves 
likely to vary both as a result of fee diversion and as a result of the PTO’s actual need for 
additional funds.  
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types with a set of dichotomous variables representing each year in 
the sample (as opposed to simply a dichotomous variable for being in 
the post-1991 period). We present the results of these dynamic 
regressions in Figures 1 and 2. For each year of the sample, we report 
the 95% confidence bands of the coefficient on the interaction between 
that year and the differential grant rate of interest (e.g., between large 
and small entities in Figure 2). The coefficient values are interpreted 
with reference to 1991, where the differential grant rate across patent 
types is normalized to zero in 1991. More simply, the results of this 
dynamic exercise can be interpreted as the time trend in the 
differential grant rates across technology categories with high and low 
maintenance rates (Figure 1) and between large and small entities 
(Figure 2), where these differential rates are scaled such that they 
equal zero in 1991. 
 
Note: the bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the estimated 
coefficients of a dynamic difference-in-difference regression specification that 
interacts the category-specific maintenance-rate variable with indicator 
variables representing each year in the 1987–2010 period. This collection of 
estimated dynamic coefficients can be interpreted as a time trend in the 
differential granting periods between patent categories with high 
maintenance rates relative to low maintenance rates. This differential is 
normalized at zero in 1991, representing the reference year. Each regression 
includes category and year fixed effects. Patent-processing and maintenance 




























1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Differential Grant Rate between Technology Categories with High and Low Maintenance Rates
Figure 1.  Dynamic Maintenance Rate Regression Results- 
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Note: the bars represent 95% confidence intervals for the estimated 
coefficients of a dynamic difference-in-difference regression specification 
(with a unit of observation at the category-year–entity-size level) that 
interacts the large-entity-size status indicator with indicator variables 
representing each year in the 1986–2010 period. This collection of estimated 
dynamic coefficients can be interpreted as a time trend in the differential 
granting periods between large and small entities. This differential is 
normalized at zero in 1991, representing the reference year. Each regression 
includes category and year fixed effects. Patent-processing and maintenance 
data are from the PTO. 
 
This dynamic approach allows us to explore the evolution over 
time in the relevant differential granting patterns. As can be observed 
in each of Figures 1 and 2, there appears to be no discernible trend in 
the direction of the expected reform effect in the pre-1991 period, 
easing any concerns that the main results in Table 2 are reflective of 
preexisting differential trends likely attributable to factors other than 
the reform. 
Of course, there remains a concern that unobservable factors 
emerging in the post-1991 period are responsible for the observed 
patterns—e.g., unobserved “shocks” in the grant rates of high-
maintenance-rate categories in the post-1991 period. We appease 
these concerns in various ways in Appendix B. For instance, in Table 
A3, we demonstrate the robustness of our results to the inclusion of 
various observable control variables (which are only available in the 


















1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Differential Grant Rate between Large and Small Entity Patents
Figure 2.  Dynamic Entity Size Regression Results- 
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estimate a so-called “triple-differences” regression that explores 
whether the differential maintenance-rate result is itself stronger 
with respect to large entities within those high-maintenance-rate 
categories (under an assumption that a benevolent PTO wishing to 
minimize its distortionary practices as much as possible would focus 
its distortionary efforts on the highest fee generators—i.e., large-
entity patents within high-maintenance-rate classes). As explained in 
further detail in Appendix A, this “triple-differences” specification 
allows us to rule out the confounding influence of a larger range of 
unobservable factors, including those that are specific to given 
technology-year combinations and to given entity-size–year 
combinations. Accordingly, this specification addresses concerns over 
unobservable “shocks” in the grant rates of large entities and high-
maintenance-rate categories in the post-1991 period. Indeed, as 
demonstrated by Table A5 of Appendix B, we find evidence suggesting 
that the divergent grant rates between high- and low-maintenance-
rate categories is itself more concentrated in large entities within 
those categories than small entities, providing general support to the 
findings presented in Table 2. 
To complement these dynamic figures, in Figure 3, we plot the 
time trend in the PTO’s sustainability score, overlayed with the trend 
in the differential grant rates between large and small entities 
(reporting the means of the coefficients displayed in Figure 2, 
represented in fractions). As demonstrated by this figure, consistent 
with the interaction results of Table 2, the degree to which the PTO 
elects to grant patents at a relatively higher rate to large entities 
(presumably to earn higher revenues) appears to be highly correlated 
with a deterioration in the Agency’s financial position—represented by 
a reduction in the PTO’s sustainability score—during the period of 
time following the imposition of the fully user-fee-funded system 
(while not shown, a similar correlation becomes apparent with the 
differential grant rates across technologies with high and low 
maintenance rates). This correlation is apparent over the long horizon 
and even with respect to several of the short-term spikes and dips in 
the sustainability score (e.g., 1994, 2005, 2006, and 2009). The graph 
also evidences an apparent correlation between the distortionary 
granting practices and a relaxation of the relevant fee-diversion 
policies in the post-2003 period. 
While not shown, we likewise calculate an alternative 
sustainability score that uses the backlog of applications awaiting a 
first office action by the Agency (using annual data received from the 
PTO pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request), as opposed to 
the total backlog of applications awaiting completion of examination.  
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Arguably more correlated with the commencement of this upward 
trend in the differential grant rates between large and small entities, 
this alternative sustainability measure, though nearly identical to the 
one presented in Figure 3, begain its downward decline in 1995, as 
opposed to 1997. 
 
 
As evidenced by Figures 1 and 2, the divergent responses to the 
1991 reform emerge with a several-year lag following 1991. This lag 
may be reasonable under an assumption that it takes the PTO some 
time to adjust its granting practices under the new fee regime. More 
likely, perhaps, this lag may be attributable to the fact that markers 
indicative of financial sustainability are particularly strong during the 
1992 to 1995 period, as demonstrated by Figure 3. The PTO may have 
experienced a financial boost over this short time period considering 
that it began to collect the substantial twelve-year maintenance fees 
for the first time during these years.106 Ultimately, the results from 
these dynamic exercises lend further support to Hypotheses 2 and 4. 
 
 106.  1994 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35, at 29 (“In the fiscal year 1994, the PTO was just 
beginning to receive the full effects of the third stage renewal.”). The PTO saw a substantial 
jump in renewal-fee income in the fiscal year 1994. Compare id. at 59 (noting that 32% of patent 








1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Differential Grant Rate b/w Large and Small Entities Sustainability Score
Differential Grant Rate Normalized at 0 in 1991
Overlayed with Differential Grant Rate between Large and Small Entities
Figure 3.  Sustainability Score Time Trend
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E.  Robustness / Specification Checks 
There is a potential concern that selection effects due to 
changes in the filing behavior among small and large entities 
following the 1991 fee reform may be responsible for the observed 
differential trends in the PTO’s granting behavior. Two selection-effect 
scenarios in particular could potentially explain the observed 
differential trends in grant rates. First, large entities or patent 
applicants in high-renewal groups may file relatively fewer patent 
applications post-1991 than pre-1991. This response could implicate a 
possible concern that a selected sample of higher-quality applications 
remained, resulting in the PTO granting more patents with respect to 
large entities and high-maintenance-rate categories. Because the 1991 
reform that modified the funding structure at the Agency level also 
carried a substantial increase in the fees charged to applicants, it is 
possible that applicants responded to this increase by reducing their 
filings107 (potentially to a higher degree among large entities and 
among those in high-maintenance-rate categories, considering the 
higher expected fees). 
Second, small entities or patent applicants in low-renewal 
groups may file relatively more patent applications after the 1991 
reform than before. This response would also implicate a concern that 
a selected sample of applications are driving our results; however, this 
selected sample would be of lower, not higher, quality. Both the post-
1991 enactment of programs at the PTO to assist small entities108 and 
the rise of the “patent troll” or the nonpracticing entity,109 could 
possibly result in small entities increasing their filings. We appease 
both of these concerns in Table A7 of Appendix B and demonstrate 
that the 1991 reform did not lead to either a reduced (and possibly 
more-selective) large-entity or high-renewal-rate applicant pool or an 
increased (and possible less-selective) small-entity or low-renewal-rate 
applicant pool in the post-1991 period. More specifically, if anything, it 
appears that the 1991 reform is associated with an incrementally 
 
REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1993, at 34 fig.9 (1994) (noting that 26% of patent fee collections resulted 
from maintenance fees).  
 107.  There is some support for a modest sensitivity of patent demand to fees. See generally 
Gaetan de Rassenfosse & B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, On the Price Elasticity of Demand 
for Patents, 74 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 58, 58–77 (2011). 
 108.  For example, the PTO began hosting an annual Independent Inventor Conference in 
1995. See Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Fifth Annual Independent Inventors 
Conference (Sept. 26, 2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2000/00-55.jsp. 
 109.  See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 630 (2008) (describing generally the rise of the patent troll). 
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higher rate of filing for large entities relative to small entities and for 
high-maintenance-rate technologies relative to low-maintenance-rate 
technologies.110 
A potential concern likewise arises that certain developments 
in substantive patent law may be responsible for the observed 
differential trends in the PTO’s granting behavior. For instance, this 
may occur if the law expands what constitutes patentable subject 
matter within technologies that happen to have high maintenance 
rates or high concentrations of large-entity applicants. Patent scholars 
have noted that patent-eligible technology has expanded largely to 
include inventions in the field of biotechnology, software, and business 
methods.111 However, most of the legal developments of this 
potentially expansionary nature with respect to biotechnology 
occurred in the early- to mid-1980’s prior to the estimation sample 
frame.112 While the mid- to late-1990’s likewise experienced 
expansions in patentable subject matter that likely targeted software 
and business method patents,113 the above results are not a reflection 
of these developments, as demonstrated by Table A2 in Appendix B. 
The estimates remain virtually unchanged when we remove those 
technology categories implicated by the relevant legal developments. 
Another possible concern arises that the divergent grant rates 
across the various patent types are a response to the passage of the 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) 
agreement in 1995. Considering the variation in category-specific 
examination times, one of the effects of TRIPS (which modified the 
 
 110.  Furthermore, a decrease in sustainability score (and thus an increased need of funds) is 
associated with an incrementally higher rate of filing for high-maintenance-rate technologies 
relative to low-maintenance-rate technologies. Finally, there is no signifigant evidence to suggest 
that a decrease in sustainability score is associated with an incrementally higher filing rate for 
small relative to large entities, which could pose troubling selection concerns. See also infra 
Appendix B (generally discussing the robustness of the above findings to the possibility of 
compositional changes in applicants among the delineated patent types). 
 111.  See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 16, at 381 (describing the “dramatic expansion of the 
scope of patentable subject matter”). 
 112.  See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980) (holding that “human-made, 
genetically engineered bacterium” is patentable subject matter); see also Policy Statement on the 
Patentability of Animals, 1077 Off. Gaz. Pat. & Trademark Office 24 (Apr. 21, 1987), reprinted in 
DONALD S. CHISUM, 9 CHISUM ON PATENTS app. 24-1 (2005) (“[T]he Patent and Trademark Office 
now considers nonnaturally occurring, nonhuman multicellular living organisms, including 
animals, to be patentable subject matter.”). 
 113.  See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (enlarging patent subject matter to include anything that provides a “useful, concrete, and 
tangible result”), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (2008); Proposed Examination 
Guidelines for Computer-Implemented Inventions, 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778, 28,778 (proposed June 2, 
1995). 
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patent term from seventeen years from issuance to twenty years from 
application) was to increase the effective patent length for some 
technology categories relative to others.114 One might argue that 
TRIPS induced those patents in the larger-expansion categories to file 
higher-quality applications in the post-1995 period, resulting in a 
higher grant rate. To the extent that such categories are correlated 
with those that also maintain their patents at high rates or that have 
strong large-entity representations, the possibility of this TRIPS story 
may confound the above analysis. In Table A2 of Appendix B, we 
address these concerns by demonstrating that the regression results 
presented above are robust to the inclusion of control variables 
capturing a differential response to being in the post-1991 period (or, 
in the alternative, in the post-1995 period) across technology 
categories with different examination prosecution times (i.e., with 
different patent-duration increases expected under TRIPS).115 
In Appendix B (primarily in Table A2), we further demonstrate 
the robustness of the findings reported in Table 2 and in Figures 1–3 
to an additional range of specification checks. These exercises largely 
demonstrate the flexibility of the above results to the use of various 
alternative approaches in either specifying the key analytical 
variables or in specifying the empirical model itself. More specifically, 
we discuss the robustness of the findings to: 
 the inclusion of control variables capturing the intensity 
of usage of requests for continued examinations (“RCE”) 
and their predecessors (i.e., continuing prosecution 
applications (“CPA”)), to alleviate concerns that some 
patent types are better able to secure ultimate 
allowances through greater usage of these mechanisms; 
 the systematic, one-by-one exclusion of each technology 
category from the regression specification (along with 
the exclusion of each patent class and broad (six-level) 
category) to demonstrate that no single technology 
(broadly or narrowly defined) is driving the results; 
 
 114.  David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of Patent Duration and 
Incentives to Innovate, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1613, 1615 (2009).  
 115.  Likewise, we also estimate the main difference-in-difference specifications for two 
different sets of patent categories: (1) within the top 25% of patent categories based on the 
expected duration increase associated with TRIPS and (2) within the bottom 25% of patent 
categories based on the expected TRIPS-related patent duration increase. We actually find a 
stronger divergent response to the 1991 fee reform for patents within the latter set of patent 
categories, suggesting that the overall findings are not likely driven by TRIPS as opposed to the 
fee reform. 
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 alternative constructions of the PTO grant rate (and the 
use of natural logs of all such rates); 
 the inclusion of various category-year-specific control 
variables; 
 the simultaneous (as opposed to separate) treatment of 
maintenance-rate, entity-size, and examination-cost 
stories; 
 the specification of the 1991 reform variable as a 
postreform linear-trend variable,116 along with the 
subsequent inclusion of technology-category-specific 
linear time trends; 
 the classification of technology categories based on (1) 
the PTO Classification System and (2) the broad six-
category classification scheme alternatively introduced 
by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg;117 
 the estimation of a “triple-differences” empirical 
specification that explores whether the divergence in 
patent grant rates across high- and low-maintenance-
rate categories is itself stronger for large (relative to 
small) entities within those categories; 
 the use of a more flexible randomization-inference 
approach to the determination of the statistical 
significance of the estimates; 
 the specification of the fee reform based on the 
percentage of the Agency’s funding attributable to user 
fees; and 
 less parametric specifications of those factors, such as 
category-specific maintenance rates, that are treated 
linearly in the main regressions. 
F.  Results Summary and Implications 
Collectively, the above findings provide consistent and robust 
evidence of: 
 an association between the 1991 reform and a 
divergence in granting patterns between patent 
applications filed by large versus small entities; 
 an association between the 1991 reform and a 
divergence in granting patterns between patent 
 
 116.  See Finkelstein & Acemoglu, supra note 91, at 855–56.  
 117.  See supra note 84. 
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applications associated with high- versus low-renewal-
rate categories; 
 a stronger association of the above nature during times 
when the PTO is more likely to be bound by financial 
sustainability constraints; and 
 a stronger association of the above nature during times 
in which the PTO is subject to a less stringent fee-
diversion policy. 
As discussed above, our results have a number of implications 
for both policy and theory.118 First, from a social welfare perspective 
our results are discouraging. Under the assumption that the PTO’s 
grant rates would otherwise reflect the optimal balance between 
dynamic innovation-stimulation incentives and static consumer 
welfare costs, any marginal increase in patent granting attributable 
solely to the Agency’s funding structure may implicate potentially 
substantial social welfare costs.119 From a policy perspective, our 
results also suggest that the 50% reduction in patent fees to small 
entities may have the inadvertent effect of biasing the PTO toward 
granting patents associated with large enterprises. As a result, it is 
possible that the PTO’s response to the fee differential may end up 
leaving small entities worse off than before this special status was 
created. On a theoretical level, our results are also relevant to the 
ongoing debate in administrative law regarding the nature of 
governmental employees. Our finding that the PTO’s granting 
distortions are more likely to occur when markers indicative of an 
underfunded PTO are present contradicts the idea that bureaucrats 
are budget maximizers while lending support to the notion that when 
agencies seek enlarged budgets they do so as a result of being mission 
minded but resource constrained. 
V.  IMPLICATIONS AND REDUCING THE PTO’S FINANCIAL INCENTIVE TO 
GRANT PATENTS 
Beyond the implications already discussed, our results are also 
relevant to the recently passed America Invents Act. This section 
begins by exploring the implications of our findings to the America 
Invents Act and then turns to sketch two possible mechanisms for 
reducing PTO bias toward granting patents: eliminating the Agency’s 
 
 118.  See supra Part I.  
 119.  See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
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self-financing requirement and changing the fee structure of the 
Agency. 
A.  Implications of the America Invents Act 
The results presented in this Article have implications for at 
least two changes brought forth to the patent system by the America 
Invents Act (“the Act”), which represents the most significant 
modification to the patent system since 1952. Our findings cast doubt 
on whether the provisions of the Act that create a new status of 
microentity and provide this entity with reduced patent fees will fulfill 
their legislative intent of nurturing innovation by individual 
inventors,120 similar to doubts that have arisen as to whether 
congressional action attempting to support small entities seeking 
patents has achieved its desired result. Our results suggest that under 
the historic fee schedule, the fee reduction provided to microentities 
will likely have the undesirable effect of biasing the PTO toward 
granting patents filed by large entities. Just as with small entities, it 
is possible that the alleged benefits that microentities obtain by 
paying reduced patent fees may be outweighed by the harms they 
experience in the marketplace because the PTO is extending 
preferential treatment toward large enterprises. 
Second, our results should help to allay some of the concerns 
voiced by those who opposed the sections of the Act that granted the 
Agency’s fee-setting authority. Several groups objected to giving the 
PTO the ability to set its fees out of fear that the Agency would act in 
a self-interested and imperialistic manner—for example, dramatically 
increasing its fees and decreasing its productivity.121 Our findings that 
the PTO’s behavior is more consistent with the model of benevolence 
than self-interestedness suggest that the PTO is more likely to 
restructure its fees to recover its aggregate costs while continuing or 
 
 120.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10(g), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 123 (2011)) (requiring micro entities to have not filed more than four 
previously filed patent applications at the PTO and to have a gross income that does not exceed 
three times the medium household income as reported by the Bureau of the Census); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 50 (2011) (describing Congress’s intent to spur innovation among 
independent inventors).  
 121.  See, e.g., Letter from Douglas Norman, President, Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n, to 
John Conyers & Lamar Smith, U.S. Congressmen (May 17, 2010), available at 
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&C
ONTENTID=25867 (“[W]e are concerned that placing fee-setting authority with the USPTO will 
lead to large declines in productivity and large increases in fees in the longer term.”).  
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expanding its current productivity than set its fees in a manner to 
clandestinely maximize its budget.122 
B.  Reducing the PTO’s Financial Incentives to Grant Patents 
Currently, our findings suggest that the inadequacies of the 
examination fees and the existence of post-allowance fees may bias 
even a benevolent PTO toward granting patents. Our results also 
suggest that this bias is most likely to manifest with respect to patent 
grants that the PTO stands the most to profit from—patents with a 
high likelihood of being renewed and patents associated with large 
entities. The PTO’s granting distortions could be eliminated by 
removing the Agency’s ability to use post-allowance fees as a 
mechanism to raise revenue. We explore two different approaches to 
this end: funding the Agency, at least partially, from direct 
appropriations and restructuring the PTO’s fee schedule. 
The PTO’s financial incentive to grant patents may be 
decreased and possibly eliminated by financing the Agency, at least 
partially, from tax revenue. If the Agency’s funding does not scale 
directly with its revenue collection, the PTO’s financial incentive to 
grant patents could be substantially curtailed. Our findings that the 
PTO’s granting bias is dampened during fee diversion support this 
contention. However, we are concerned that Congress may fail to 
adequately fund the Agency. Mounting concern regarding deficit 
containment as well as Congress’s past track record of utilizing PTO 
fees to fund other governmental activity (even when the Agency’s 
financial sustainability was in question) suggest that serious 
consideration should be given to eliminating the PTO’s granting bias 
by restructuring the Agency’s fee schedule. 
The PTO has very recently been given the ability to set its fees 
to recoup its aggregate costs by rulemaking.123 As a result, modifying 
the Agency’s fee schedule may be easier today than before the Agency 
had such authority.124 Importantly, any fee schedule adopted must 
take into account not only the PTO’s needs for financial sustainability 
but also the incentives and social welfare of patent applicants and 
society. More research is needed on how both the PTO and patent 
 
 122.  See supra Section IV.B (suggesting that the PTO’s behavior reflects an attempt to 
increase grant rates in an effort to raise additional revenue only when the Agency is financially 
constrained not in an effort to maximize budget more generally).  
 123.  America Invents Act § 10(a)(2).  
 124.  At the time this Article was written the PTO had not proposed changes to its 
examination, issuance, or renewal fees.  
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applicants would respond to fee changes, and thus it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to propose an optimal fee structure of the PTO.125 
Nonetheless, we believe it is helpful to begin to explore fee structures 
that are likely to eliminate or dampen the PTO’s pro-patentee 
tendencies identified in this Article. 
To begin, the PTO cannot choose to eliminate the fee reductions 
for small entities and microentities, as this is beyond the scope of its 
rulemaking authority.126 Thus, one way to reduce the PTO’s incentives 
toward granting patents to large entities may be to adopt a fee 
schedule that curtails the Agency’s incentives toward allowing patents 
in general. 
The PTO could dampen its incentives to grant patents by 
adopting a fee schedule that will align its examination fees with 
examination costs and/or enacting other pre-allowance fees—i.e., 
restructuring its fee schedule so that it garners a greater percentage 
of its budget through pre-allowance fees. Because the PTO is required 
to set its fee collections to match its operational expenses, an increase 
in the level of examination fees will likely necessitate a decrease in the 
level of post-allowance fees. This fee schedule will likely reduce the 
Agency’s tendency to grant patents, because the PTO will be less 
likely to be constrained by financial sustainability—i.e., the Agency 
will be less sensitive to dips in the nonbiased grant rate or aggregate 
renewal fee collections. However, when the Agency’s sustainability is 
triggered, the distortionary bias to grant patents will likely be larger. 
The PTO will have to grant more patents to meet a revenue target 
than it would have under its traditional fee structure because the 
Agency stands to make less money per patent grant than it did under 
the traditional fee schedule. 
Additionally, as long as the Agency is dependent on back-end 
fees, its pro-patentee tendencies will not be eliminated. The PTO will 
still have to grant a certain percentage of patents in order for its fee 
collections to match its operational expenses, and a number of factors 
will continue to possibly disrupt the Agency’s financial equilibrium.127 
 
 125.  Recent studies have shown that, at least with respect to low patent fees, patent 
demand is relatively inelastic. See de Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe, supra note 106, at 71–72 
(finding that the demand for patents is responsive to price, but relatively inelastic); Timothy K. 
Wilson, Patent Demand – A Simple Path to Patent Reform, 2 INT’L IN-HOUSE COUNS. J. 806, 810–
12 (2008) (arguing that filing fees need to be raised significantly in order to reach the elastic 
portion of the demand curve). 
 126.  It also seems unlikely that Congress will extinguish these fee reductions, as the 
America Invents Act just created the microentity status.  
 127.  See supra Section I.B.2 (describing factors that may produce imbalance in the ratio of 
post-allowance fees and operational expenses). 
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Of course, the fact that the Agency has recently been granted fee-
setting authority means the PTO can attempt to reestablish financial 
equilibrium by changing its fee structure, rather than granting 
additional patents. However, there are several reasons why the 
Agency may struggle with utilizing rulemaking to routinely tweak its 
fee schedule.128 First, legislative challenges and procedural 
requirements associated with rulemaking may increase the cost of the 
process to such a level that the Agency will not be able to frequently 
utilize the process to change its fee structure.129 Second, to the extent 
the Agency is facing an impending financial crisis, the PTO may not 
be able to enact fee increases fast enough to boost its revenue, as the 
rulemaking process can take years to complete.130 Thus, a PTO that is 
both dependent on back-end fees and facing immediate financial 
pressures may still turn to granting additional patents in an effort to 
augment its fee collections. 
Perhaps the only way to eliminate a self-sufficient PTO’s bias 
toward granting patents is to abolish post-allowance fees altogether. 
Under this approach the Agency’s examination fees would need to be 
dramatically increased, and possibly other pre-allowance fees would 
need to be enacted in order for the PTO’s fee collections to cover its 
 
 128.  It is likely, though, that the PTO will be able to use rulemaking to occasionally change 
its fee structure.  
 129.  See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW 
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 617–20 (6th ed. 2009) (describing institutional impediments to 
rulemaking). The PTO, like many other agencies, has struggled with using rulemaking to 
implement changes. For example, in 2007 the PTO utilized rulemaking to limit the number of 
continuation applications as well as the number of claims that could be included within each 
application. However, the Agency ultimately rescinded the regulations amidst court challenges. 
See Tafas v. Doll, 559 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009), vacated, 328 Fed. App’x 658, 658 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (holding that both the claim and continuation rules were procedural in nature and 
within the Agency’s rulemaking authority, but that the continuations rule was inconsistent with 
patent law); Tafas v. Doll, 328 Fed. App’x 658, 658–59 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (granting petition to 
rehear the case en banc, vacating the panel opinion); Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 
(E.D. Va. 2008) (granting summary judgment against the PTO); Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 
652, 671 (E.D. Va. 2007) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing the PTO from 
implementing changes to the continuation practice on the eve of their implementation); Changes 
to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications Containing Patentably 
Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 
21, 2007) (codified at scattered sections of 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) (revising patent rules regarding 
continuing applications); Press Release, U.S. Pat. & Trademark Office, USPTO Rescinds 
Controversial Patent Regulations Package Proposed by Previous Administration (Oct. 8, 2009), 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/09_21.jsp (reporting on the PTO’s Final Rule rescinding 
regulations, providing background on the rules, and reviewing related litigation history). 
 130.  Several agencies have abandoned rulemaking altogether, largely in part due to 
frustration with the slow pace at which the process proceeds. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION 
BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 16 
(1982) (describing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s evolution toward adjudication). 
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operational expenses. As the Agency’s entire fee stream would derive 
from pre-allowance activity, the Agency would no longer have a 
financial incentive to grant patents, because the Agency no longer 
stands to gain any additional fee revenue from patent grants. While 
this fee structure would eliminate the pro-patentee tendencies 
identified in this Article, it is not clear that it would enhance 
consumer welfare overall. The elimination of maintenance fees would 
effectively mean that all patents would last their entire term of twenty 
years, which may substantially increase the static costs of patents to 
society. Furthermore, depending on how patent applicants would 
respond to increased fees, patent applications may fall to a level below 
ideal.131 The former concern could be addressed, however, by 
preserving renewal fees but restricting the amount of renewal fees the 
PTO can retain. The restricted fees could be utilized to pay a portion 
or all of the small-entity and microentity subsidy. This funding 
structure would likely result in dampening the Agency’s bias toward 
issuing patents that are likely to be renewed or that were filed by 
large entities. Most likely, Congress would need to enact additional 
changes to the PTO’s funding structure in order to achieve this result, 
but these changes would be minor. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article presents the first empirical study of the influence 
of the PTO’s funding on the Agency’s decision on whether or not to 
grant a patent. Our findings suggest that the PTO’s current fee 
schedule likely biases the Agency to grant patents. Moreover, we find 
the Agency’s bias is more likely to manifest with respect to patents 
that it stands to profit the most from granting—patents that are likely 
to be renewed or patents filed by large entities. Furthermore, we also 
find that these distortions are more likely to occur when markers 
indicative of an underfunded PTO are present. 
In addition to their theoretical implications, our findings also 
speak to policy issues concerning patent law. Prior to our study, 
commentators failed to recognize the extent to which the PTO’s fee 
schedule biased the Agency toward issuing patents. As a result, recent 
 
 131.  See supra note 125 (citing sources that illustrate relative inelasticity of patent demand 
at least with respect to low patent fees). A simple decrease in patent filings does not necessarily 
have negative social welfare implications. Patent applicants may respond to the increased fees by 
better sorting patent applications—i.e., filing applications that are more likely to meet the 
standards of patentability. Companies and individuals may also utilize alternative mechanisms 
to protect their ideas, such as trade secrecy.  
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patent reform, which was enacted in part to address the harms 
associated with the PTO issuing too many invalid patents, may not 
eliminate the granting pressure identified in this Article. Moreover, 
our results have a number of implications for the recently enacted 
America Invents Act, including the creation of microentity status 
wherein eligible patent applicants pay 75% reduced patent fees. Our 
findings suggest that the fee reductions for microentities are likely to 
have the unintended consequence of further biasing the PTO toward 
granting patents to large entities. 
 
